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Introduction
Research and Development (R&D) is the driving force behind our wealth. The importance of 
R&D is well  documented by the amount  governments,  universities  and firms together  spend in 
R&D: around 1.4 trillion US dollars a year.1 Especially firms use R&D as one of the important 
instruments in order to increase their profits both in competitive and non-competitive environments. 
In general there are two types of R&D-investments: process R&D and product R&D. 
Product R&D refers to investments and activities which are aiming at either producing new 
products or improving the quality of an existing product.  The firms benefit  from product R&D 
because consumers are willing to pay more for a product with higher quality, respectively the firms 
benefit from entering into new markets with their new products. 
Process R&D means firms' investments in their productive efficiency and all activities aiming 
at cheaper production of known products. This type of R&D investment intends to decrease the 
firms' production costs and usually results in higher margins for the firms. 
Both types of R&D are generally beneficial both for the firms – otherwise the firm would not 
make the investment in R&D – and for the consumers. The reason is that after the firms invest in  
R&D, their profit-maximizing-strategy aims at adjusting their new prices in a way that enables them 
to benefit both from a higher margin and higher demand. 
Consumers normally benefit from product R&D because even if firms increase their prices 
parallel with the higher quality, they usually increase the prices to a lesser extent than the quality 
improvement. So in spite of higher prices, the demand for the improved good increases after the 
firms' R&D investments, which can be a sign of higher consumer benefit.
 Similar to the case of product R&D, the profit maximizing strategy of the firms which invest 
in process R&D is also to  profit  from higher margins  and higher  demand.  Therefore the firms 
usually have an incentive to partially pass through the cost reductions to the consumers,  which 
again benefits the consumers. Thus – assuming that higher productive efficiency does  not lead to 
lower product quality – consumers also profit from the firms' investments in process R&D. 
In this thesis, I will concentrate on the latter case, namely on process R&D. However, both 
product  and  process  R&D  have  a  similar  effect:  they  increase  the  gap  between  consumers' 
maximum willingness to pay and firms' marginal costs. Thus most of the results of this thesis – after 
examining  and excluding possible sources of differences – are transferable to the results of product 
R&D.
1 The Economist, January 12th-18th 2013, Page 11
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As it is mentioned above, R&D investments are an important instrument in any competitive 
environment  for the firms to  increase their  profits.  Joseph Schumpeter  develops the concept  of 
creative  destruction  in  his  books  "The  Theory  of  Economic  Development"  (1934),   "Business  
Cycles" (1939) and especially in "Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy" (1942). In the latter, he 
writes "Capitalism [...] never can be stationary. The fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the 
capitalist engine in motion comes from the new consumers’ goods, the new methods of production 
or transportation, the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise 
creates.  [...]  The  opening  up  of  new  markets,  foreign  or  domestic,  and  the  organizational 
development  [...]  illustrate  the  same  process  of  industrial  mutation  [...]  that  incessantly 
revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly 
creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is  
what capitalism consists in and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.". The so called 
Schumpeterians stress the expectation of (at least temporary) monopoly profits as the main driving 
force of both product and process innovation.2
However,  early  empirical  papers  such as  Scherer  (1965)  and (1967),  show results  which 
question Schumpeter's theory. Also in the theoretical front, the fundamental work of Arrow (1962) 
provides a different view to Schumpeter's thesis. He shows that for both drastic and non-drastic 
innovations a firm under perfect competition always invests more than a monopolist.  Only few 
papers,  such as  Nickell  (1996),  can  provide  at  least  weak empirical  evidence  that  competition 
increases firms' efficiency. The further discussion – derived from Cournot variant of Arrow's work 
– about the relationship between competition and R&D incentives leads to an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the amount of R&D investments and the degree of competition.3  
This  Ph.D.  thesis  contributes  to  the  discussion  about  investments  in  process  R&D  by 
presenting three papers. The paper "R&D incentives in vertically related markets" discusses how 
R&D incentives in a vertically related bilateral duopoly depend on different market circumstances. 
More precisely,  the paper examines how the intensity of simultaneous interbrand and intrabrand 
competition  influences  the  R&D investments  in  the  downstream and upstream market.  Among 
others, this paper shows a U-shaped relationship between R&D incentives and both interbrand and 
intrabrand competition. This contradicts the result of papers such as Aghion et al. (2005). Even 
though these two papers'  approaches  are  too different  to  be comparable  – as  it  will  be further 
explained in the paper's introduction – it is worth understanding the roots of these differences.
2 By mentioning "new methods of production or transportation", Schumpeter is basically meaning process R&D 
and the "new consumers’ goods" that was mentioned by Schumpeter, can be interpreted as product R&D. 
3 See for example Aghion et al. (2005)
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Beyond that, the model also considers how R&D investments of a firm influence the actions 
and profits of both the competitor in the same market and of the firms in a vertically related market. 
It shows that there are vertical spillovers of R&D, because asymmetries among firms in any market 
are  dampened  by vertically  related  firms.  This  finding  is  especially  important  if  we take  into 
account that some countries such as France legally forbid price discrimination in input markets. 
Forbidding price discrimination abolishes this  dampening effect  and can harm the less efficient 
retailer. In extreme cases, the absence of the dampening effect can lead to the elimination of the less 
efficient retailer.
The paper "Profitable Entry into an Unprofitable Market" shows how the entry into a per se 
unprofitable  market  can become a generally profitable  investment  for a firm.  It  shows that  the 
market entry of a firm into a new market with a product which uses a similar production technology 
to an already existing product of the firm, has the positive side effect of committing the firm to 
higher investments in process R&D. This self-commitment of the firm intimidates its competitors in 
the old market from investing in R&D. The lower R&D investments of the competitors in the old 
market yield higher profits for the expanding firm in that market. In certain ranges of parameters, 
the higher profits in the old market can overcompensate the losses caused by the entry into the new 
market. This paper shows the typical parameter constellations such as market sizes, cost structures 
and competitive environment which enable that market entry into an unprofitable market to turn out 
to be profitable. This finding can be of interest to strategic decisions of firms concerning market 
entry.
The Paper "Consumer-Welfare-Enhancing Merger to Monopoly" considers two markets that 
are "connected" through at least one firm which is active with similar products in both markets. The 
paper examines through a simulation how changes in market concentration of one market harms or 
benefits consumers in another market due to changes in market competition and changes in R&D 
incentives. One important result of this paper is that a higher concentration in a market for example 
due to a merger of two firms can lead to higher consumer surplus in the other market and even to a 
higher aggregated consumer surplus. If the welfare loss of the consumers in the market where the 
merger takes place is less than the welfare gain of consumers in the other market, the merger or 
acquisition enhances aggregated consumer welfare.  I show that this result can even hold in the 
extreme case when the merger causes a change in competition mode from duopoly into a monopoly. 
This finding can be helpful for the decision of competition authorities such as the FTC in the United 
States or the Bundeskartellamt in Germany. The outcome of this paper is also valid in the opposite 
direction, namely that the entry of a firm into a market can harm aggregated consumer surplus, even 
though consumers benefit in the market where the number of competitors increase. Furthermore, the 
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paper examines the typical combination of parameter-ranges such as the degree of competition, 
sizes of the two markets, cost structures of the firms etc. for which monopolization can yield higher 
aggregated consumer surplus. The two latter papers show that whether R&D investments are higher 
under  Monopoly,  or  under  competition,  or  the  relationship  between  R&D  investments  and 
competition  is  non-linear,  depends  on  parameters  and  circumstances  such  as  whether  price 
discrimination is possible or not.
The remainder of this Ph.D. thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 contains the abstracts of  
the submitted papers. Chapters 3 to 5 present the papers. Chapter 6 contains the Curriculum Vitae 
and chapter 7 the affidavit.
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1 Introduction
Every purchasing decision of any consumer usually involves these two questions: “Which 
product should I buy?” and “Where should I buy this product?”. The order of the questions can be 
either way: for example some people decide first to buy a certain laptop model and then decide 
which retailer they want to buy it from; other consumers decide first to visit a certain retailer to see 
which laptop they would like to  buy there.  Some consumers  visit  several  retailers,  before they 
decide which laptop to buy in which store. No matter how the decision is made and which decision 
is made first, it is obvious that competition and product differentiation exist in two different but 
vertically  related  markets.  Not  only are  both product  and process  innovation  important  for  the 
competitors in the consumer goods industry,  they also matter in the retailing sector. This paper 
models a vertically related bilateral duopoly with imperfect competition in both markets, and shows 
what influence the degree of competition in the upstream and downstream market has on prices, 
quantities,  profits  and on investments  in  research  and development  (R&D).  Moreover,  we also 
discuss under which circumstances consumers benefit more from R&D.
As we will discuss this more detailed later, most of the existing papers that deal with R&D in 
a  vertically  market  structure,  use  the  simplifying  assumption  of  either  monopoly  or  perfect 
competition in the upstream market or downstream market respectively.  However, in many real 
world  situations  we can  usually  observe  oligopoly  competition  both  among  manufacturers  and 
retailers. The manufacturers are in interbrand competition with each other through the degree of 
substitution  of  their  products  which depends on product  characteristics  and product  brand;  and 
retailers' intrabrand competition is characterized by various different retailers' services, images or 
locations.  This  paper  extends the existing literature  by providing a framework,  which  gives  an 
insight  into  a  vertically  related  bilateral  duopoly  with  simultaneous  interbrand  and  intrabrand 
competition. Hereafter, we consider R&D incentives in the upstream and/or downstream market. 
We also examine how an investment of a retailer or a manufacturer in process R&D influences the 
profits  of  other  firms  in  the  same  market  and in  the  vertically  related  market  depending  on 
exogenous  factors.  Hereby,  we  assume  that  only  one  competitor  from  the  upstream  and/or 
downstream market invests in R&D – for example by buying a patent. 
Our work is related to both fields of R&D and vertical relations. Much literature in the area of 
vertical relations usually considers the effects of (horizontal) mergers on input prices, especially 
focusing on the analysis of downstream horizontal mergers.1 Other papers of vertical relations have 
1   For example Dobson and Waterson (1997), Inderst and Wey (2003), and von  Ungern-Sternberg (1996)
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some common restrictions to simplify the analysis such as monopoly or perfect competition in the 
upstream or downstream market – e.g. Dobson and Waterson (1997) and Chen (2003) – or vertical 
price fixing like Retail Price Maintenance (RPM) – such as Dobson and Waterson (2007).2 Also the 
link between vertical market structure and pricing in successive oligopoly is frequently discussed in 
the literature for example by Abriu et al. (1998), Chen (2001), Elberfeld (2001 and 2002), Gaudet 
and Long (1996), Jansen (2003) and Linnemer (2003) and Ordover et al. (1990).
Although these papers explain important aspects of retail sale behavior, they do not have the 
element of imperfect competition in both upstream and downstream market. In contrast to the extant 
literature, this paper allows imperfect competition among manufacturers as well as retailers for the 
wide  range  from  monopoly  to  perfect  competition,  combined  with  asymmetric  costs  in  both 
upstream and downstream stage.
Based on the pioneering works of Schumpeter (1934, 1939 and 1942) and Arrow (1962), the 
R&D literature  explains  underinvestment  in  R&D according  to  various  reasons  which  include 
uncertainty,  indivisibility,  externality and other factors such as labor market policy.3 Uncertainty 
can  lead  –  for  instance  because  of  risk  aversion  of  agents  –  to  underinvestment  in  R&D. 
Indivisibility can cause underinvestment if there is an increasing return in R&D. Uncertainty and 
indivisibility are not relevant in our paper.4 Literature concentrating on externalities, such as Spence 
(1984),  usually  explains  underinvestment  in  R&D due to  the presence  of  (horizontal)  spillover 
effect  in  R&D.  Horizontal  spillover  assumes  that  a  firm's  R&D  investment  also  reduces  the 
production costs of the rival firms. Spence (1984) concludes that because spillovers generate free-
rider  problems,  a  firm's  incentive  to  undertake  R&D  activities  is  reduced.  Other  papers  also 
consider  vertical  spillover  effect  of  R&D in  different  setups  of  vertically  related  markets.  For 
example,  Ishii  (2004)  considers  a  bilateral  duopoly  model  with  Cournot  competition  and 
homogeneous products in both markets, and assumes a symmetric spillover between the firms in the 
vertically related markets.  This assumption includes that knowledge spills over at the same rate 
from upstream firms to the downstream as it does in the opposite direction. In our model, even if  
there  is  no vertical  and/or  horizontal  transfer/spillover  of  knowledge  in  any  direction,  no 
2 Another paper  that  assumes  homogeneous  goods  in  a  bilateral  duopoly  is  Ishii  (2004).  In  his  paper,  he  
compares different modes of R&D-cooperation and research joint ventures.
3 For example Haucap and Wey (2004) show that investment incentives are highest, if an industry union sets a  
uniform wage rate for all firms.
4 Another field of R&D research, which is connected to this paper in the broader sense, is about the connection 
between Innovation and patent  protection,  such as Jaffe  and Lerner (2004),  O’Donoghue and Zweimuller 
(2004) and Chu (2009) to mention a few of them. 
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uncertainty, no indivisibility or other factor that has been discussed in the R&D literature, we show 
that the existence of a vertically related market with imperfect competition yields  a dampening 
effect of marginal cost differences.5 This effect in turn lowers R&D incentives and that yields, for 
two reasons, to underinvestment in process R&D from the social planner's point of view:
1. Marginal cost reduction of a firm through its R&D investments yield lower price setting of 
that  firm.  This  creates  a positive externality  effect  on the firms in  the vertically related 
market, which is not considered in the R&D decision of the investing firm.
2. As a firm invests  in  R&D, the firms  in the vertically  related  market  react  to  the R&D 
investments  by  increasing  their  own margins.6 Since  the  investing  firm  anticipates  this 
reaction of vertically related firms, it has diminishing incentives of R&D investments which 
leads  to  underinvestment  in  R&D.  We  show  how  the  magnitude  of  the  R&D-decline 
depends on the degree of competition in both stages of the market. 
The latter finding extends a common result of DeGraba (1990) and Yoshida (2000). They 
both use a similar set up of a vertical market structure with a monopolist upstream firm and two 
downstream firms competing  à la Cournot with homogeneous goods. Both papers find that when 
the upstream supplier is allowed to price discriminate, he charges the downstream firm with lower 
marginal costs a higher price, and subsides its less efficient competitor. In our model, we show that 
in an extended bilateral duopoly set up with imperfect competition in both markets, this effect exists 
in  both directions – i.e. downstream firms also increase their margins for the good of the more 
efficient  manufacturer.  This  effect  might  seem  anti-intuitive  since  it  implies  that  the  larger 
downstream firm,  that  purchases  more  of  the  input,  pays  a  higher  price.  As  DeGraba  (1990) 
mentions, “quantity discounts are used as a self-selection mechanism when the seller does not know 
the demand curves of the buyers”. Since the upstream firms in our model know the demand curve 
for each buyer, quantity discounts are here unnecessary. 
Our model shows that both interbrand and intrabrand competition have twofold impacts on 
firms'  incentives  to  invest  in  R&D.  There  is  a  U-shaped  relationship  between  the  degree  of 
competition among the firms in a market and the R&D incentives of the firms in the vertically 
related market. On the one hand, a more intensive competition in the vertically related market leads 
to lower double marginalization and therefore higher sales, which makes R&D investments more 
attractive to firms. On the other hand, higher differentiation of firms in the vertically related market  
5 Inderst and Shaffer (2009) show that under other circumstances the opposite result can occur: if there is only a 
monopolist  in the upstream market with observable two-part  tariff  contracts,  the monopolist would set a  lower 
wholesale-price for the more efficient firm.
6 In this paper we refer to absolute margins, that is, the difference between equilibrium prices and marginal costs.
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serves  a  wider  range of  consumer  tastes  and yields  ceteris  paribus  higher  demand,  which  also 
increases R&D incentives. 
The relationship between the degree of competition and R&D incentives in the same market 
are also U-shaped. On the one hand, an increasing degree of competition at a low or intermediate 
level  lowers  the  R&D  incentives  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  it  yields  ceteris  paribus  decreasing 
consumers'  demand. Secondly,  it  leads to more aggressive price reaction of the competitor as a 
reaction to R&D investments of the innovative firm. On the other hand, if the goods are relatively 
homogeneous,  then  higher  competition  increases  the  R&D incentives  of  the  investing  firm  as 
business stealing effect increases significantly. On the first glance, our U-shaped result contradicts 
the inverted-U relationship that was found by Aghion et al. (2005). They find that in their model 
“competition may increase the incremental proﬁt from innovating, labeled the “escape-competition 
effect,”  but  competition  may  also  reduce  innovation  incentives  for  laggards,  labeled  the 
“Schumpeterian  effect.”  The balance  between these two effects  changes  between low and high 
levels of competition, generating an inverted-U relationship.” Contrary to their model, it seems that 
in our bilateral duopoly model higher R&D incentives are rather when the competition environment 
among the firms allows favorable conditions either for the “escape-competition effect” or for the 
“Schumpeterian effect”. This is the case when competition is in its extreme boundary areas, and 
generates a U-shaped relationship. 
However,  the  results  of  Aghion  et  al.  (2005)  are  for  the  following  reasons  not  easily 
comparable with the results in our paper. They use their own predefined price cost margin of the 
firms to measure the competition within an industry. In our paper, we use the degree of product 
homogeneity as a competition measure.  Furthermore,  our result  refers to the  entire range from 
Monopoly to  perfect  competition,  while  they refer  to  the rather competitive  area.  Beyond that, 
Aghion et al. measure the innovation through the patenting activity. This can contain a significant 
time lag between the actual R&D investment and the patent itself. Within this time lag, the degree 
of competition might change significantly. In our paper we don't consider the patent activity, but the 
R&D investments. Moreover, we consider only the relationship between degree of competition and 
R&D investments in a theoretical model, while Aghion et al. consider empirical data, which can be 
influenced by many other  unobservable  factors.  For  example  firms  can  be run by “satisﬁcing” 
managers who do not value only proﬁts per se. They also draw private beneﬁts from maintaining 
the ﬁrm aﬂoat,  and thereby keeping their  job.  In this  case,  increasing competition may lead to 
“private incentives” of the manager to invest more in R&D in order to avoid bankruptcy.7 
We also show that, if the firms in a market are asymmetric, the firm with lower marginal costs 
7 For more information to this principal-agent model please refer to Hart (1983).
6
usually profits from R&D investments of a firm in the vertically related market, while the firm with 
higher costs does not always profit. The R&D investment of a firm in vertically related market is 
for the high-cost-firm only profitable, if the consumers' maximum willingness to pay is high enough 
and competition in vertically related market is tough enough. We also show that welfare gain of 
R&D in upstream market increases both with the degree of interbrand and in particular with the 
degree of intrabrand competition. 
Another aspect of R&D is based indirectly on Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985), who 
compare differentiated Bertrand vs. Cournout competition with differentiated goods and find out 
that prices are lower (and hence outputs and welfare are higher) under Bertrand competition than 
under Cournot  régime. A number of papers such as Qiu (1997), Breton et al. (2004),  as well as 
Hinloopen and Vandekerckhove (2007) consider the welfare effects of R&D and show that output 
and welfare effects of R&D are higher under Bertrand competition if interbrand competition is not 
very tough. This model can also support these findings.
The next section will introduce a vertical model with interbrand and intrabrand competition. 
In Section 3, we will  introduce R&D investments  in the upstream stage.  In Section 4, we will  
consider welfare effects and draw conclusions for policy makers. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
In this  section,  we will  describe a  basic  vertically  related  market  which is  related to  the 
common framework of several papers of Dobson and Waterson  (1996, 1997, 2007). We modify 
their basic framework by changing two elements. We introduce asymmetries in both upstream and 
downstream market,  and  we assume  that  consumers'  maximum willingness  to  pay is  a.8 After 
introducing  the  industry  structure  and  demand  side,  we  solve  the  equilibrium  of  the  vertical 
structure recursively.
Industry Structure
There  are  two  manufacturers,  Mh and  Mg ,  indexed  by {h , g }∈{1,2}∧h≠g. Each 
manufacturer produces and sells  its own branded product to all  retailers.  Thereby,  M1 produces 
8 Dobson and Waterson set, without loss of generality, consumers' maximum willingness to pay per assumption equal  
to 1.
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good 1 and M2 produces good 2. The two retailers, Ri and Rj, indexed by {i , j }∈{1,2}∧i≠ j , both 
sell the products of all upstream firms to the consumers.
The manufacturers  supply the products to the retailers  at  a constant  unit  price,  where the 
wholesale price between retailer  i  and manufacturer  h is  wih for quantity qih, which is then sold to 
final  consumers  at  the  retail  price  pih.  Manufacturers'  goods  are  substitutes  and  the  degree  of 
interbrand competition is represented by γ which can vary between zero (independent goods) and 
one (perfect substitutes). Both goods 1 and 2 are distributed by both retailers 1 and 2. In this model 
manufacturers do not prefer any retailer, hence they are indifferent whether their products are sold 
by retailer 1 or 2.9
Retailers are also competing with each other through different retailer services associated with 
their  location  or  characteristics,  which  can  be  interpreted  in  different  ways.10 The  degree  of 
intrabrand competition β measures how substitutable retailers' services are, and can also vary from 
zero (independent retailer services) to one (perfect substitutes).  
Manufacturers and retailers compete à la Bertrand. The constellation of the frame model is 
illustrated in the graph below.
     Manufacturer h        γ      Manufacturer g
       Retailer i          β            Retailer j
Consumers
A  very  simple  example  is  the  electronic  industry.  Imagine  two  competing  laptop 
manufacturers  with  comparable  performance  and  equipment  (no  vertical  differentiation).  Their 
products are good substitutes for most consumers. If one of the manufacturers changes its product 
9 Some  papers  about  vertical  relations,  such  as  Kourandi  and  Vettas  (2009), consider  positioning  of  a 
manufacturer next to a retailer.
10 Tirole (1988, p. 177) mentions several examples of retailer's services such as free delivery, trading stamps, free 
alterations, credit, pre-sale information, elaborate premises, excess sales to keep waiting lines short.
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and produces tablets, then the manufacturers' products are now more differentiated from consumers' 
point of view. The laptops of manufacturers  1 and  2 can be sold by two very similar retailers, 
located next to each other (such as Best Buy and Staples). The same laptops can be sold also in 
online shops such as Amazon or computer specialist shops as well. While the similar laptops sold 
by Best Buy and Staples in the same city are still good substitutes, the same laptop sold by Amazon 
attracts partly different consumer groups and is not such a good substitute any more. Therefore, 
differentiated retailers can also be an element of manufacturers' product differentiation.
Manufacturers  have  some  constant  marginal  costs  of  production  represented  by  ch for 
manufacturer h and cg for manufacturer g. Retailers' marginal costs consist of two blocks: wholesale 
price  and  the  additional  marginal  cost  to  distribute  the  good,  which  we  call  hereafter  the 
“operational marginal costs”. The operational marginal costs are denoted by ci respectively cj and 
are constant as well. Retailers pay linear wholesale prices to the manufacturers, whereas retailer  i 
pays the linear wholesale price wih for good h and so forth. The wholesale prices are assumed to be 
committed  and cannot  be  renegotiated.  The  reason why we stay  with  linear  wholesale  pricing 
instead of two part tariffs is that two-part tariffs are contracts with a more complicated nature than 
linear  wholesale  prices  and  lead  to  more  problems  of  imperfect  contracts.  Beside  that  linear 
wholesale prices help the feasibility of the model.  Fixed production costs in both upstream and 
downstream market do not change the results. For this reason we assume fixed production costs to 
be zero for both manufacturers and retailers without loss of generality.
Demand Side
For simplicity, the demand is illustrated by a representative consumer who purchases all the 
goods q11, q12, q21 and q22, whereas q12 is the amount retailer 1 purchases from good 2 and so forth. 
The representative consumer can be considered as the sum of the purchases of all the consumers 
from each good depending on its price. The representative consumer maximizes his linear quadratic 
utility function. The representative consumer's gross utility is: thereby:
U=a (qih+qig+q jh+q jg)−
q ih
2 +q ig
2 +q jh
2 +q jg
2
2
−β(qih q jh+qig q jg)
−γ(q ihq ig+q jh q jg)−δ(q ihq jg+q jh qig)
 
(1)
For  this  term  and  –  if  applicable  –  for  all  other  terms  of  this  paper  applies 
∀{h , g }∈{1,2}∧{i , j}∈{1,2}∧h≠g∧i≠ j. The demand effect of the rival brand sold at the rival 
retailer  is  represented  by  δ.  In  our  model,  where  both  retailers  distribute  products  of  both 
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manufacturers, the inverse demand function for good h sold by retailer  i can be easily derived by 
solving the four first order conditions with respect to quantities:
p ih=a−qih−βq jh−γq ig−δ q jg ,where {β ,γ ,δ}∈[0,1 ]  
where {β ,γ ,δ}∈[0,1 ].
(2)
Since parameter  δ  measures how substitutable different goods are, which are sold through 
different  retailers,  it  contains  both  the  degree  of  competition  among  retailers  and  among 
manufacturers. Therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that δ is a function of  both the degree of 
interbrand competition γ, and the degree of intrabrand competition β. With (imperfect) interbrand 
and intrabrand competition it is clear that δ should be less than both β and γ. We weight both of  
these influences in equal proportions and assume hereinafter that δ = β γ. This assumption, which 
has also been used by other papers such as Dobson and Waterson (1996), reduces the number of 
variables to just two key parameters β and γ. Beside feasibility, this allows us to present a graphical 
analysis. We would like to emphasize that there is no necessary correlation, positive or negative, at 
the definitional  level  between β (degree of intrabrand competition)  and γ (degree of interbrand 
competition). 
Inserting δ = β γ, rearranging and solving the inverse demand functions, leads to the following 
demand function for good h sold by retailer i:
q ih=
a(1−β)(1−γ)−p ih+p jhβ+p igγ− p jgβγ
(1−β2)(1−γ2)
,where {β ,γ}∈[0,1 [  (3)
The case of perfect competition in either upstream market or downstream market has been 
already discussed in the previous literature. Therefore, the result will be only briefly mentioned and 
not further discussed here: If a manufacturer (retailer) has lower marginal costs, it captures the entire 
market. Otherwise, we assume that each manufacturer (retailer) serves half of the market. 
2.1 Equilibrium
Downstream Market
The model  is solved recursively. First  we have to solve the retailers'  profit  maximization 
problem for given wholesale prices. By setting the retail prices pih and pig, each retailer maximizes 
his profit function.
πi=q ih( pih−wih−ci)+qig( pig−w ig−c i) , where i∈{1,2}  (4)
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By inserting (3) into the profit function, we get: 
πi=∑
h=1
2
( pih−wih−ci)
a (1−β)(1−γ)− pih+ p jhβ+ pig γ−p jgβ γ
(1−β2)(1−γ2)
, where i∈{1,2}  (5)
The profit maximizing first order conditions of retailer i is:
∂πi
∂ pih
=0⇔ a
1+β+γ+βγ
+
ci+w ih−2 p ih+p jhβ+(2 pig−c i−wig−p jgβ)γ
(1−β2)(1−γ2)
=0  
∂πi
∂ pig
=0⇔ a
1+β+γ+β γ
+
c i+wig−2 p ig+ p jg β+(2 p ih−c i−w ih−p jhβ) γ
(1−β2)(1−γ2)
=0
(6)
These first order conditions lead to the equilibrium retail price of each good h∈{1,2} sold 
by retailer i∈{1,2} depending on wholesale prices:
                                             p ih=
a 2−−22wihc iw jhc j
4−2
 (7)
The retail prices increase ceteris paribus, the higher firm i's marginal costs and its competitor's 
marginal  costs  are,  and  the  higher  the  wholesale  price  of  good  h for  the  retailer  and  for  it's 
competitor is. Assuming that the total marginal costs of the competing retailer – which is wjh+ cj – is 
less than the consumers' maximum willingness to pay, a higher β yields decreasing retail prices. The 
retail prices do neither depend directly on degree of interbrand competition nor on the wholesale 
prices of the substitute good g paid by the retailer. Later we will show that the wholesale price of 
any good depends on degree of interbrand competition and the wholesale prices of the substitute 
good. Inserting β = 0 in (7) leads to the standard monopoly price p ih=aw ihc i/2. On the other 
extreme,  the  better  substitutes  the  goods  become,  the  more  does  retail  price  pih
approach p ih=2wihc iw jhc j/3. As  soon  as  interbrand  competition  exceeds  a  certain 
threshold (which we will analyze later), the retailer with higher operational marginal costs exits 
from the market and the remaining monopolist sets prices low enough to keep the competitor out of 
the market. 
Substituting (7) in (3) yields the equilibrium outputs depending on wholesale prices: 
qih=
a 2−−21−−2−2 wih2
2w ig w jhw jg1−c i2−
2 −c j 
4−5 241−2
 (8)
The terms for qig, qjh and qjg are analogous.
Upstream Market
After solving the problem of firms in the downstream stage, we consider now the second step 
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of the game and solve the profit maximizing problem of the upstream firms. The marginal costs of 
manufacturers  h and  g  are  denoted  by  ch and  cg respectively.  In  this  stage  each manufacturer 
maximizes  his  profits  by  choosing  wholesale  prices  taking  into  account  how wholesale  prices 
influence the retail prices and thus the sales. 
The profit function of manufacturer h is:
πh=(wih−ch)qih+(w jh−ch)q jh∀h∈{1,2}  (9)
By inserting (8) in (9), building the profit maximizing first order conditions subject to wih and 
wjh, and solving them we get the wholesale prices:  
w ih=
a 2−−22ch−c ic gc i1
4−2
(10)
If retailers have symmetric operational marginal costs (ci  = cj), then manufacturers have no 
incentive to price discriminate among retailers. If the manufacturers' goods are independent (γ = 0), 
then  manufacturer  h's  wholesale  price  for  retailer  i is  (a+ch – ci)/2.  The  higher  interbrand 
competition  γ, the stronger wholesale prices depend on marginal costs of the competitor, and the 
lower are equilibrium wholesale  prices  ceteris  paribus.  The wholesale  prices do  not depend on 
degree of intrabrand competition. 
By  inserting  (10) in  (7) and  (8) we  derive  the  retail  prices  and  outputs  in  equilibrium 
depending  only  on  exogenous  parameters  such  as  manufacturers'  costs,  consumers'  maximum 
willingness to pay and the degree of interbrand and intrabrand competition:
     p ih=a−
a
2−2−

2chc g
2−4−2

2ci c j
4−22−
(11)
q ih=
a
2−22−2
−
ch2−
2−cg 
2−24−524
−
ci2−
2−c j 
2−24−524
 (12)
If we assume that there is a monopoly in both stages (β = γ = 0), we get the standard solution
p ih=
achci
4
and q ih=
a−ch−ci
4
due to double marginalization in the vertical structure.11 For 
11 If  we consider the case of  symmetric  manufacturers  and symmetric  retailers,  then the wholesale  price in  
equilibrium will be for all the goods and each retailer w=a−
a−c
2− and the corresponding equilibrium output 
for each of the goods sold by any retailer is q ih=
a−c
2−1 2−1 . The common retail price for all 
goods is p=a−
a−c
(2−β)(2−γ)
, the profits of both manufacturers are i=1−  and retailers' profits are
πh=α
(1−β)
(2−β) , where α=
2(a−c)2
(2−β)(1+β)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
.
The profits of manufacturers decreases as  β approaches to 0.5 or as  γ increases. Retailers' profits decrease as  β 
increases or as γ decreases.
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the same reason, the retail price converges to p ih=
2chc icgc j
3
, the tougher interbrand and 
intrabrand competition become (β , γ → 1).12 
By calculating the prices for Cournot competition in both markets we find that prices are 
lower and thus  outputs  and welfare  are  higher  under Bertrand competition  which confirms the 
results in the existing literature. The Cournot results can be found in appendix A. 
Profits
In order to make the discussion of manufacturers' profits more feasible, we assume both firms 
in the downstream market have symmetric operational marginal costs cd (cu). Substituting (10) and 
(12) back into (9) leads – under the assumption c i=c j=cd – to the profit function of manufacturer 
h in equilibrium:
h=
2  c gcdchcd −2chcd a 2−−
22
2−24−221−2
 (13)
Since β can only be found in the denominator of manufacturers' profit, the dependency of 
manufacturers'  profits on intrabrand competition in the downstream market can be expressed as
1/2−2. Thus, the manufacturers' profits have a U-shaped relationship with the retailers' 
degree of substitution β: They increase as β gets closer to the borders 0 or 1 (either if retailers' 
services are totally independent or perfect substitutes) and they decrease as β gets closer to 0.5.
The reason for this U-shaped relationship is that if retailers are in perfect competition, there is 
no double marginalization. The elimination of double marginalization leads ceteris paribus to lower 
retail prices and hence, to an increase of demand for manufacturers' goods. On the one hand, higher 
differentiation of retailers' services lead to higher double marginalization effect. But on the other 
hand, if retailer services are more differentiated, more consumer tastes are served, and due to the 
assumed linear quadratic utility function, the demand is ceteris paribus higher. This countervailing 
effect leads to a second maximum level of upstream firms' profits with respect to the intrabrand 
competition by β = 0. Therefore,  a change in degree of intrabrand competition has a U-shaped 
external effect on the profits of both manufacturers.
Inserting (10), (11) and (12) into (5) leads – under the assumption ch=cg=cu – to the profit 
function of retailer i in equilibrium:
12  As we mentioned above, if manufacturers (retailers) are asymmetric, the demand of the weaker competitor  
collapses,  as  soon as  the  difference  among the  marginal  costs  of  manufacturers  (retailers)  exceeds  a  certain 
threshold. This threshold will be analyzed in proposition 1 in section 3.
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πi=
2(2(c i+cu)−β(c j+cu+β(c i+cu))+a (2−β−β
2))2
(2−γ)2(1+γ)(4−β2)2(1−β2)
 (14)
The dependency of downstream firms' profits on competition in the vertically related market 
can be expressed as
1
(2+γ−γ2)(1+γ)
. Thus, the profits of retailers increase with the degree of 
competition among manufacturers.
In opposite to the manufacturer's profits, retailers' profits strictly increase with the degree of 
competition  in  the vertically related market.  The reason lies  in  the different  effects  that  higher 
degree  of  competition  has  for  the  vertically  related  market.  While  higher  competition  in  the 
upstream market yields lower wholesale prices for the retailers, higher Degree of competition in the 
downstream market lowers the double marginalization effect. Since the first effect is stronger than 
the latter effect, only the effect of lower double marginalization can be overcompensated through 
higher demand caused by higher differentiation among retailers. Higher product differentiation of 
manufacturers' products causes higher wholesale prices on the on hand, and ceterus paribus higher 
consumer demand on the other hand. Here, higher wholesale prices can not be compensated by the 
higher demand. Therefore, higher product differentiation yields lower profits for the retailers.
3  Research and Development
This chapter focuses on analyzing the incentives to invest in process R&D. We assume that 
only  one  firm in  each  level  –  in  the  upstream market,  in  the  downstream market,  or  in  both
markets – can invest in process R&D and that the amount of marginal cost reductions is common 
knowledge. For example consider the case, where an inventor offers a patented innovation to the 
firms,  so  that  only  the  highest  bidding  firm  can  use  the  innovation.  Adding  research  and 
development  to  the  basic  model,  which  already  contains  some  complex  features,  requires  the 
simplifying  tool  of  considering  just  the  R&D  incentives  instead  of  endogenizing  the  R&D 
investment. Therefore, we consider the impact of the determinants on R&D incentives devoid of 
specifying the amount of R&D investment. In this paper, we consider the case where the firms in a 
market have equal marginal costs before the R&D stage. Thus, we assume implicitly that the firm 
which invests in R&D obtains a marginal-cost-advantage.13
13 It is also possible to consider other cases. Assume for example a case, where the investing firm has a location  
disadvantage and compensates  this disadvantage through R&D. Slight modifications on this model  allows the 
discussion  of  such cases.  However,  this  paper  focuses  on the case  where the competitors  in the  upstream or  
downstream market have equal pre R&D marginal costs.
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We will  first  start  in  subsection  3.1  to  consider  R&D incentives  of  manufacturer  i with 
symmetric downstream firms. Afterward, in 3.2 we consider the R&D incentives for retailer h with 
symmetric upstream firms. Subsection 3.3 discusses how R&D investment in a market depends on 
both the degree of competition in that market as well as in the vertically related market. Finally, we 
introduce asymmetries in both markets by allowing R&D for both manufacturer h and retailer i in 
subsection 3.4.
3.1 R&D investments in upstream market
We assume that manufacturer h reduces his marginal costs by amount d through some fixed 
investments FU in process R&D. Before manufacturer h invests in R&D, both upstream firms h and 
g have symmetric marginal costs denoted by cu. Downstream firms' operational marginal costs are 
assumed to be symmetric and are denoted by cd. This assumption will be relaxed later.
The profits of retailers are:
πi=q ih( pih−wih−cd )+qig( pig−w ig−cd )  ∀ i∈{1,2} (15)
Manufacturer h's marginal costs reduce due to R&D to cu  - d and it sets its wholesale prices 
according to the reduced marginal costs. This yields the following wholesale price of manufacturer 
h:
w ih=w jh=
a−cd1−cu
2−
− 2 d
4−2
 (16)
The better  substitutes the goods are – i.e. the greater  γ is – the “more aggressively”  does 
manufacturer h reduce its wholesale prices in order to better use its marginal cost advantage due to 
R&D investment. The reason is the higher business stealing effect that comes along with a higher 
degree of substitution of products.
Due to the new wholesale prices of upstream firm h, manufacturer g reacts by decreasing his 
wholesale prices as well. But since manufacturer g has higher marginal costs than its competitor h, 
it does not decrease its wholesale prices as strongly as manufacturer  h does. The new wholesale 
prices of manufacturer g are therefore:
w ig=w jg=
a−cd1−cu
2−
− d
4−2
 (17)
The  better  substitutes  the  goods  are,  the  stronger  does  manufacturer  g reduces  its  price, 
because consumers react more sensitively to price differences. As long as both manufacturers are 
active in the market, their price-setting-behavior depends - among other factors – on operational 
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marginal costs of retailers. From (16) and (17) follows that both manufacturers set higher wholesale 
prices the lower the operational marginal costs of retailers are. De Graba (1990) shows this effect 
for one price discriminating manufacturer and two retailers, who compete à la Cournot and face a 
linear demand for the final good. We show that this result also holds when there are two firms in the 
upstream market, downstream firms compete à la Bertrand, and the demand curve in the final goods 
market is non-linear. The reason for this effect in our model is, similar to De Graba, due to the more 
inelastic demand of the low cost firm. 
We  have  to  take  into  account  that  if  costs  are  more  different  –  or  products  are  more 
substitutable – than a certain threshold, only one firm can remain in the market. If manufacturer h's 
price  reduction  exceeds  a  certain  threshold,14 the  demand  of  the  weaker  competitor  collapses, 
because the difference among the marginal costs of manufacturers are too much. 
Proposition 1:  Manufacturer g, who does not invest in R&D, produces it's product qg only if its  
marginal cost disadvantage d is less than (a−cu−cd )(1−γ)(2+γ)γ .
  
Proof: See Appendix B. □
There  are  three  different  types  of  competition  regimes  that  can  be  found  among 
manufacturers.15 As long as both manufacturers are in the market, there is a duopoly competition. 
As proposition 1 shows, if marginal cost differences due to firm h's R&D investments are higher 
than a certain threshold, manufacturer g's demand collapses and it exits the market. In this case, we 
have to distinguish between two other possible competition regimes, depending on whether firm h's 
innovation is drastic or not. If it is drastic, i.e. the monopoly wholesale price of manufacturer h is 
below it's competitor's marginal cost, firm h simply sets its monopoly wholesale price. Otherwise, it 
is a contestable market and manufacturer h's optimal duopoly wholesale price is the following limit 
price:
w ih=w jh=a−cd−
(a−cd−cu)
γ  (18)
This price is just low enough to keep manufacturer g out of the market. Manufacturer h sets 
limit prices in  (18) if price reduction  d exceeds the threshold d=a−cd−a−cd−cu/ to keep 
the competitor out of the market, but is not high enough to be drastic. The better substitutes the 
14 Analogously we can say: “if interbrand competition exceeds a certain threshold,...”. The threshold for degree of 
interbrand competition is =8a−cd−cu
2a−cd−cud 
2−acdcu−d
2a−cd−cu 
.
15 These competition regimes can be found analogously for the retailers when they have different marginal costs.
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goods are, the lower sets manufacturer h its limit price.
The innovation is drastic, if d3 cucd−a . As mentioned above, manufacturer  h sets its 
monopoly wholesale prices since they are now below the limit  prices in  (18). The price setting 
behavior  of  both  manufacturers  subject  to  manufacturer  h's  marginal  cost  reduction  d is 
demonstrated in the graph below.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Marginal cost
Reduction d
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10
15
Wholesale Price
of Manufacturer h
Graph 1:  Price  setting  behavior  of  manufacturer  h (solid  line),  which  invests  in  process  R&D to  reduce  its 
marginal costs, and manufacturer g (dashed line). The parameter values of this graph are: a = 38, γ = 0.8, cd = 15, 
cu = 15. 
The graph above illustrates the three different competition regimes. In this illustration there is 
a  duopoly competition  among the firms  if  d is  below the threshold d=5.6. If  d exceeds  this 
threshold, manufacturer g drives out of the market. As long as d is within the range [5.6 , 12], the 
market is a contestable market with manufacturer  g as potential entrant and manufacturer  h sets 
limit  prices.  If  d > 12,  then the innovation is drastic and there is no threat of competition and 
manufacturer  h sets the monopoly wholesale price.  The different price setting phases are in this 
graph separated by threshold values of parameter d. However, as it was mentioned previously in a 
footnote, it is also possible to assume a fix value for  d, and consider instead different threshold 
values of  γ instead of  d. The price setting phases we consider is analogous to the entire range of 
possibilities that can be found for values of γ in [0 , 1]. 
As both manufacturers reduce the wholesale prices due to process R&D, the retailers face 
lower  marginal  costs  for  both  goods.  From  (16) and  (17) follows  that  R&D  investments  of 
manufacturer h have therefore a positive externality effect on the retailers, which is 2 d /4−γ2 for 
good  h and d / 4−2 for good  g. The positive externality effect of R&D is higher, the better 
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substitutes the products are. The difference in the wholesale prices of manufacturers  g and  h is
d /(2+γ). Thus the difference in wholesale prices of manufacturers in this model represents only 
1/2 to 1/3 of the difference in marginal costs. 
Since retailers face lower costs, they will set lower final prices for the goods. The new retail 
prices of goods h and g are:
        p ih=p jh=a−
a−cu−cd
2−2−
− 2d
2−4−2
 for good h and
p ig= p jg=a−
a−cu−cd
2−2−
− d 
2−4−2
for good g.
(19)
Unless  the  retailers'  services  are  perfect  substitutes,  they  do  not  pass  through  the  total 
reduction of the wholesale prices to the final consumers. A price reduction of manufacturer h by the 
amount of 2 d /4−γ2 , leads to a final price reduction of good g by d /4−22−. Thus, 
even customers who only buy product  g, profit from R&D investments of firm  h  as well. Since 
manufacturer g lowers the wholesale prices to a lesser extent than manufacturer h, the retail price of 
product g is by d /22− higher than the retail price of product h. Not only the intensity 
of price reduction, but also the altitude of the difference in retail prices among the goods depends on 
the  degree  of  both  interbrand  and  intrabrand  competition.  If  manufacturer's  products  are  very 
similar, manufacturer  g reacts stronger to the price reduction of his competitor; this leads ceteris 
paribus  to  a  weaker  difference  in  retail  prices.  Thus,  in  a  vertical  model  with  interbrand  and 
intrabrand competition and asymmetric  manufacturers,  similar  retail  prices of the same good at 
different retailers can be either a sign of intense competition among manufacturers or a sign of low 
competitive pressure among retailers! 
Lemma 1: Retailer's pass through rate of the lower wholesale price is
1
2−
.
Proof: Equilibrium (19) shows that cost reduction of manufacturer h is partly passed through to the 
final price of good h with a total pass through rate
2d
4−22−
. In addition to this, the final 
price  of  good  g decreases  by
 d
4−22−
.  These  total  pass  through  rates  consist  of 
manufacturers' pass-through rates and retailers' pass-through rates. 
From (16) and  (17) we get manufacturers' wholesale price reductions to retailers which are
2d /4−2 for  good  h and  d /4−2 for  good  g.  By dividing  Manufacturers'  wholesale 
price  reductions  through total  pass  through rates,  we get  Retailers'  pass  through rate,  which  is
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1
2− .   □
Lemma 1 shows that up to 50% of the cost differences among the manufacturers is dampened by 
retailers. Through lemma 1 we can show proposition 2.
Proposition 2: R&D investments in the upstream market lead to stronger price reductions for final  
consumers the higher both degree of interbrand and intrabrand competition is. This is true for all  
non drastic innovations.
Proof: See Appendix C. □
`
3.2 R&D in the downstream market
Retailers'  total  marginal  costs  consists  of  two  cost  blocks:  the  wholesale  prices  and  the 
operational marginal costs ci for retailer i and cj for retailer j to distribute a good. In this subsection 
we assume that both retailers have identical operational marginal costs cd before investing in R&D. 
Analogous to the previous chapter, I assume that one retailer – hereafter denoted by retailer i – can 
invest the fixed costs FD in process R&D to reduce its operational marginal costs by r.16 Therefore 
we express the operational marginal costs of retailer  j as  cd and the operational marginal costs of 
retailer i as cd - r. In this subsection we assume that manufacturers are asymmetric, hence ch ≠ cg.
The R&D investments  of retailer  i leads to a reduction of marginal  costs  of that  retailer. 
Hence, the retailers' profits are:
πi=∑
h=1
2
q ih( pih−wih−cd+r )−F D
π j=∑
h=1
2
q jh( p jh−w jh−cd )
 (20)
Since retail prices are functions of r, the profit maximizing prices of retailer i are: 
p ih=
a 1−cd
2−

2 wihw jh −2 r
4−2
,  (21)
And retailer j's retail prices are:
16  This could be motivated in different ways: The process R&D can be an investment in a new warehousing or in  
a  new  logistic  system.  Alternatively,  one  can  also  imagine  that  the  downstream  firms  are  just  in  another  
intermediate stage and need the output of upstream firms for their products, which is the input for the firms in the  
next stage. In this case, the process R&D can be an investment in a new technology, which reduces the marginal  
costs of producing the (intermediate-) good of the downstream firm.
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p jh=
a 1−cd
2−

2 w jhwih − r
4−2
,  (22)
Inserting the prices into the quantities of retailer i yield:
qih=
a−cd
2−21

w jh−w ih 2−
22 w ig−w jg −wig 
2
 4−5 24 1−2 

r 2−2 
4−5 241
 (23)
And retailer j's output is:
q jh=
a−cd
(2+β−β2)(1+γ)
+
w ihβ−w jh (2−β
2)+γ(2 w jg−w igβ−w jgβ
2)
(4−5β2+β4)(1−γ2)
−
rβ
(4−5β2+β4)(1+γ)
 (24)
Inserting  (23) and (24) into (9) and maximizing subject to the wholesale prices and solving 
the  four  first  order  conditions  and  solving  the  equation  system leads  to  the  wholesale  prices. 
Manufacturers' wholesale prices are
w ih=
a−cdr 1−
2−

2ch cg
4−2
,  ∀ h∈{1,2}
w jh=
a−cd1−
2−

2 ch cg
4−2
,       ∀ h∈{1,2}
(25)
From  (25) it follows that – unless manufacturers'  goods are perfect substitutes – upstream 
firms  price  discriminate  among  retailers  with  asymmetric  marginal  costs,  which  is  caused  by 
process R&D of retailer i. While manufacturers charge retailer j the same wholesale price as before, 
they increase the wholesale price of the innovative retailer i by: 
w ih(r )−wih(r=0)=r
(1−γ)
(2−γ)  (26)
If manufacturers' are symmetric and their goods are perfect substitutes (γ=1), they simply set 
the wholesale prices equal to their marginal costs and therefore, they will not price discriminate 
among the asymmetric retailers. The more differentiated manufacturers' goods are, the more they 
will increase the wholesale price for retailer i as a fraction of r. If manufacturers are monopolists 
(γ=0),  half  of  the retailer's   marginal  cost reduction  is  absorbed by higher  wholesale  prices  of 
manufacturers. 
An explanation of why the more efficient retailer faces a higher wholesale price, lies in the 
price elasticity of demand η=
∂q
∂ p
p
q
. In this case, the price elasticity of demand for the product h 
by retailer i is:17
17 We introduce for better analysis of price elasticity the assumption  cg  =  ch =  cu. This assumption is only for the 
equations (27) and (28) in this subsection. 
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 ih=
p ih
a 1−1−− pih p jh  pig− p jg 
 (27)
The price elasticity increases with the retail price pih. Inserting pih from (19) in (27) (whereas 
d = 0) leads to the price elasticity depending on the external variables:
 ih=
cdcua 3−2−−2
a−cd−cu1−1−
 (28)
The lower the operational marginal costs (cd) of a distributing retailer is, the lower its price 
elasticity  of  demand  is.  Hence,  the  retailer  who  invests  in  process  R&D  and  decreases  its 
operational marginal costs, has a lower price elasticity of demand than its competitor. Therefore, the 
manufacturers increase wholesale prices for retailer i as it invests in R&D, while they do not change 
the wholesale prices for retailer j, which absorbs a part of the inequality of retailers. 
After analyzing the impact of retailer  i's  process R&D on manufacturers'  wholesale-price-
setting, we analyze the effect on final prices. From substituting back (25) into(21) we get retailer i's 
prices depending on exogenous variables only: 
p ih=a−
a−cd
2−2−

2 ch c g
2−4−2
− 2 r
4−22−
 (29)
Inserting (25) into (22)  shows retailer j's final prices in dependence of exogenous parameters 
only:
p jh=a−
a−cd
2−2−

2 ch c g
2−4− 2
−  r
4−22−
 (30)
Although retailer  j's marginal costs remain constant, it reacts to the lower costs of retailer i  
and also sets lower retail prices. 
Subtracting  (29) from (30) shows that even though retailer  j  reacts to price reduction of its 
competitor, retailer j's final price is by
r
22− higher than retailer i's final price. 
Inserting (29) and (30) in (8) leads to the quantities depending only on external variables:
q ih=
a−cd
2−22−2

 cg−ch 2−
2
2−22−2

r 2−2
4−5242− 2
, (31)
The quantity sold by retailer j is:
q jh=
a−cd
2−22− 2

 cg−ch2−
2
2−22− 2
− r 
4−5242−2
 (32)
Similar to the case of R&D in upstream market,  retailer  j will sell  no goods any more if 
retailer i's cost reduction exceeds a certain threshold.   
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Proposition 3:  The retailer with higher marginal costs operates under Bertrand regime only if
r2−− 2 a

cd 1c g ch−2cdch , where ch represents the marginal costs  
of manufacturer with low marginal costs and cg represents its competitor's marginal costs.
  
Proof: The proof is equivalent to proof of proposition 1. □
Comparing (29) and (30) with (11) shows that retailer i reduces its price by
2 r
4−22−
and the competitor  reduces its  price by
 r
4−22−
. These price reductions consist  of two 
parts:18 
– Retail-price-setting of downstream firms depending on R&D effect
– Manufacturers' wholesale-price-setting. 
How R&D investments  of  retailer  i impact  manufacturers'  wholesale  prices  wi. and  wj is 
already shown in (26) and discussed above. Here we will briefly consider the impact of downstream 
firms'  retail-price-setting  behavior.  In  order  to  see  the  pure  mechanism of  this  effect  only,  we 
consider the price setting behavior of retailers under the assumption that manufacturers set the same 
wholesale prices that they were setting before R&D investments of retailer i. 
Hereby,  retailer  i decreases  its  price  by 2 r /(4−β
2) and  retailer  j  by β r /(4−β
2). A 
comparison of these terms with  (29) and  (30) shows that the dampening effect of manufacturers' 
price setting causes lower differences in retail prices.
3.3 Impacts of interbrand and intrabrand competition on results of R&D
As we have mentioned in the introduction, there are several papers, such as Qiu (1997) and 
Breton et al. (2004), that analyze R&D incentives depending on the degree of competition between 
the innovating firm and its competitors.19 One of the contributions of this paper is to go beyond the 
dependence of R&D incentives on the degree of competition in the same market and to analyze how 
R&D incentives in a market depend on the degree of competition in the vertically related market. In 
order to analyze R&D incentives of manufacturer h, we compare how the profit increases if a fixed 
18 These price reductions are analogous to the total pass through rate of manufacturer  h's R&D investment, hence it 
means what proportion of the marginal cost reduction is passed through to the retail prices.
19 Other papers such as Lin and Saggi go one step further and show that investments in process R&D increase with the  
degree of product differentiation, and they also discuss the relationship between process R&D and product R&D.
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amount of R&D is invested depending on interbrand and intrabrand competition.
The profit of manufacturer h is: 
h=
2[ 2cdcu−d −cdcucdcu−d −a 2−−
2]2
2−14−221−2
 (33)
The derivative of manufacturer's profit function with respect to d considers the profit gain of 
manufacturer h through higher  process  innovation,  without  taking the fixed costs  into  account. 
Therefore, it demonstrates the incentives of manufacturers to invest in R&D. The R&D incentives 
of manufacturer h is:
∂h
∂ d
=
−42−22 cdcu−d  cdcucdcu−d  −a 2−−
2
2−14−22 1−2
 (34)
In order  to  analyze  under  which value  of  intrabrand competition  manufacturer  h has  the 
highest/lowest incentives to invest in R&D, we differentiate  (34) with respect to  β. Setting the 
derivative  equal  to  zero  and  solving  for  β  leads  to  the  only  solution  β=  ½.  Since  the  second 
derivative of manufacturer h's R&D incentives is positive, the R&D incentives of the manufacturers 
are minimized if  intrabrand competition is at  β = ½. Since this is the only local extremum for
β∈[0,1] , we conclude that the R&D incentive of manufacturer  i consistently increases as the 
value of β approaches the extreme values zero and one. When β approaches 1, competition among 
retailers become tougher and retailers' pass through rate of wholesale price reduction, which is a 
consequence of manufacturers' R&D investments, increases. On the other hand, due to the assumed 
linear quadratic utility function, when β approaches 0, the higher differentiation of retailers' services 
yields  ceteris  paribus  higher  consumer  demand.  This  in  turn,  yields  higher  R&D incentives  of 
upstream firms. 
The graph below depicts the derivative of manufacturer h's profit with respect to γ. In other 
words,  it  shows  how R&D incentives  of  manufacturer  h change,  depending  on the  degree  of 
interbrand competition γ. 
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Graph 2: Changes in manufacturer h's R&D incentive subject to degree of interbrand competition. The parameter 
values of the graph are:  a = 24,  cd = 8,  cu = 8,  d = 3, β = ½. The degree of interbrand competition  γ is on the 
horizontal axes, and manufacturer h's R&D incentives is on the vertical axis. 
In  the  area  where  γ  is  below  (above)  the  threshold  value γ̄≈ .46 , tougher  interbrand 
competition yields lower (higher) R&D incentives. The lower the costs of investment in process 
R&D are, the lower is the value of the threshold γ̄ .
In  the  area  where  interbrand  competition  is  relaxed,  an  increasing  degree  of  interbrand 
competition  γ causes lower R&D incentives of manufacturer  h. The reason is that the competitor 
reacts more strongly to firm h's R&D investments and decreases its wholesale prices more, when γ 
increases. This leads to lower profit-gain through R&D investment of manufacturer h and therefore, 
lower R&D incentives of that firm. 
In the relatively high ranges of γ – hence when competition is tough, but not tough enough to 
force manufacturer g exit the market –  then the profit gain due to R&D is increasing and convex 
for higher γ. Under these circumstances, the wholesale price is already close to the marginal costs 
before manufacturer  h invests  in R&D and hence,  the margins  of manufacturer  g are low. The 
higher γ is, the lower are the margins of firm g and therefore, the less “elastic” – or  in other words 
the weaker – is firm g's price reduction as a reaction to firm h's R&D investments. For this reason, 
R&D incentives of manufacturer h increases, the tougher interbrand competition is. 
If the degree of interbrand competition is close enough to 1 so that the innovation is drastic, 
manufacturer  h is enabled to set it's monopoly price in order to keep the competitor out of the 
market.  Therefore,  manufacturer  h always invests  the “monopoly-level”  in R&D, and its  R&D-
incentives do not change due to a further rise of degree of interbrand competition. 
If the combination of the degree of interbrand competition γ and the marginal-cost-reducing-
innovation d is high enough to keep manufacturer g out of the market, but is not high enough to be 
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drastic,  manufacturer  h applies  limit  pricing.  In  this  range,  an  increasing  γ  yields  lower  R&D 
investments of firm 1.
The  figure  below  visualizes  the  combined  relationship  between  manufacturer  h's  R&D-
incentives, the degree of intrabrand competition β, and the degree of interbrand competition γ. 
Graph 3: R&D incentives of manufacturer h subject to the degree of interbrand and intrabrand competition. The 
parameter values of the graph are the following: a = 20, cd = 4, cu = 4, d = 2.
The graph shows the R&D incentives of manufacturer h, which is mathematically expressed 
as
∂πh
∂ d
, subject to interbrand
∂πh
∂γ∂ d
and intrabrand
∂h
∂ ∂ d
competition.
It has been already discussed, manufacturer  h's R&D incentives are minimized if  β = ½. 
Hereby, if β∈[0.5 ;1] , higher β yields higher R&D incentives of manufacturer h and if th value 
of β is in the range β∈[0 ;0.5] , the R&D incentives increases the lower β is.
A lower γ has, similar to the case of β, an increasing demand effect due to the assumed utility 
function. On the other hand, an increasing γ yields higher business stealing effect, which in turn 
yields more benefits of R&D investment for manufacturer h. If γ is higher than a certain threshold, 
manufacturer g can even be driven out of the market.
3.4 R&D in upstream and downstream market
In this subsection, we solve the model for simultaneous R&D investments of manufacturer h 
and  retailer  i. Because  of  the  simultaneous  R&D  investments,  we  have  asymmetries  in  both 
upstream and downstream market.  In the earlier  sections,  we have shown that if the firms in a  
market are symmetric, they both profit from the R&D investment in the vertically related market. In 
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this section we consider what happens with the profits of both asymmetric firms, if a firm in a  
vertically related market expands its investments in process R&D. First, we consider the market 
equilibrium. In the downstream stage the retailers' gross profits are: 
πi=q ih( pih−wih−cd+r )+qig ( pig−w ig−cd+r )−F D
π j=q jh ( p jh−w jh−cd )+q jg ( p jg−w jg−cd)
 (35)
Solving the downstream stage leads to the following profit maximizing retail prices:
pih=
a (1−β)+cd
2−β
+
2w ih+βw jh−2r
4−β2
,∀ i∈{1,2}
p jh=
a (1−β)+cd
2−β
+
2wih+βw jh−β r
4−β2
,∀i∈{1,2}
 (36)
The corresponding quantities are:
qih=
a−cd
(2+β−β2)(1+γ)
+
w jhβ−wih (2−β
2)+γ(2 wig−w jgβ−wigβ
2)
(4−5β2+β4)(1−γ2)
+
r (2−β2)
(4−5β2+β4)(1+γ)
,
∀h∈{1,2}
q jh=
a−cd
(2+β−β2)(1+γ)
+
w ihβ−w jh (2−β
2)+γ(2 w jg−w igβ−w jgβ
2)
(4−5β2+β4)(1−γ2)
+ r (2−β
2)
(4−5β2+β4)(1+γ)
,
∀h∈{1,2}
 (37)
The profits of manufacturers are: 
πh=q ih(wih−cu+d )+q jh(w jh−cu+d )−FU
πg=qig(wig−cu)+q jg(w jg−cu)
 (38)
Taking the profit maximizing first order conditions and solving the equation system leads to 
the following wholesale prices:
w ih=
(a−cd+r )(1−γ)+cu
2−γ
− 2d
4−γ2
,  w jh=
(a−cd)(1−γ)+cu
2−γ
− 2d
4−γ2
,
w ig=
(a−cd+r )(1−γ)+cu
2−γ
−
γ d
4−γ2
, w jg=
a−cd 1−cu
2−
−  d
4−2
(39)
Next, we consider the effects of process R&D in one market stage on the profits of the firms 
in the vertically related market by building the derivative of the firms' profits with respect to the 
cost reduction in the vertically related market.
The derivative of manufacturer h's profits w.r.t. R&D investments in downstream market is: 
∂πh
∂ r
=
2(a−cu−cd )(1−γ)
(2+β−β2)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ 2 r (2−β
2)(1−γ)
(4−5β2+β4)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+
2d (2−γ2)
(2+β−β2)(2−γ)2(1+γ)(2+γ)
 (40)
All three fractions are always positive, for all  γ and β in the range [0, 1[,  as well as for all
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a > cu + cd (which indicates that the maximum willingness to pay of consumers is higher than the 
aggregated costs of upstream and downstream stage). Therefore, a raise in process R&D investment 
of retailer i always increases manufacturer h's profits. 
Manufacturer g's derivative is:
∂πg
∂r
=
2(a−cu−cd )(1−γ)
(2+β−β2)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ 2 r (2−β
2)(1−γ)
(4−5β2+β4)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
− 2d γ
(2+β−β2)(2−γ)2(2+3 γ+γ2)
 (41)
Since the third fraction in (41) is negative, the entire term can become negative if the values 
of  d and  γ  are  high  enough.20 Thus higher  process  R&D investment  of  retailer  i can  decrease 
manufacturer g's profits, especially when the values of d and γ are high. 
Next, we examine whether retailers' profits react in a similar way to manufacturers'  R&D 
investments. The derivatives of the profits of retailers  i with respect to R&D investments in the 
upstream market is:
∂πi
∂d
=
2(a−cu−cd )(1−β)
(2−β)2(1+β)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ 2 r (2−β
2)
(2−β)2(2+3β+β2)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+
2 d (1−β)(4−3γ2)
(2−β)2(1+β)(4−γ2)2(1−γ2)
 (42)
All three fractions are always positive, for all  γ and β in the range [0, 1[  as well as for all
a  >  cu +  cd. Hence, a raise in process R&D investment of manufacturer h yields always higher 
profits for retailer i.  Retailer j's derivative is:
∂π j
∂ d
=
2(a−cu−cd)(1−β)
(2−β)2(1+β)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ 2 d (1−β)(4−3γ
2)
(2−β)2(1+β)(4−γ2)2(1−γ2)
− 2 r β
(2−β)2(2+3β+β2)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
 (43)
Since the third fraction is always negative, retailer  j's  profit can decrease if the values of r 
and/or β are sufficiently high. The terms (40) to (43) show very similar results, namely that only the 
more  productive  retailer  always  profits  from higher  R&D investments  in  the  vertically  related 
market, while the effect on the unproductive firm is twofold. As we see in the terms (41) and (43), 
higher  R&D  investment  of  retailer  i  (manufacturer  h)  yields  lower  profits  of  manufacturer  g 
(retailer j) if:
20 A higher value of parameter  d increases the value of the negative fraction in absolute terms. The term 1/(2-γ)2 is 
common in all three fractions. If we hypothetically take out this term from all fractions, we can see the effect of an  
increasing  γ, namely lowering the relative value of the positive fractions and increasing the relative value of the 
negative fraction. 
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– manufacturer g's  (retailer j's) marginal cost disadvantage is high
– degree of intrabrand (interbrand) competition is high
These findings are crucial both for authorities and for the stakeholders of the firms in both 
stages. Competition authorities might think about means to reduce R&D incentives in a stage, for 
example if higher R&D can yield market exit of weak competitors in the vertically related market. 
Also the stakeholders might use these effects. For example if the innovative firm wants to take over 
the weaker (Stronger) firm in the vertically related market, it might be better to do this after (before) 
their own R&D investments. In this case they might achieve a better purchase price since their own 
R&D investments ceteris paribus lowers (increases) the profits of the targeted firm. This can be 
discussed more detailed in a future work.
4. Consumer Surplus
In this chapter we analyze  the determinants of consumer surplus before and after process 
R&D. By subtracting consumers' expenses for the goods from the gross utility of consumers in (1), 
we get the net consumer surplus from consuming the goods. 
As a benchmark, we use the net consumer surplus before R&D investments with symmetric 
manufacturers and retailers  (CS0):
CS0=
2a−cd−cu
2
2−2 12−2 1
 (44)
Higher competition among manufacturers and retailers leads on the one hand to lower prices, 
but on the other hand to lower variety for the consumers. The derivative of the consumer surplus  
with respect to β respectively γ shows that the effect of lower prices on consumer welfare exceeds 
the effect of lower product variety for the consumers:
∂CS
∂ 
=
6a−cd−cu 
2−3122−21
0  
∂CS
∂
=
6a−cd−cu
2−3122−21
0
(45)
Although there is a welfare increasing element of variety in the assumed demand function, it 
follows  from  (45) that  higher  competition  in  any  market  stage  leads  ceteris  paribus  to  higher 
consumer surplus. If a manufacturer invests in process R&D, consumer welfare increases by: 
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ΔCS=
2 d (a−cd−cu)
(2−β)2(1+β)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ d
2(4−3 γ2)
(2−β)2(1+β)(4−γ2)2(1−γ2)
 (46)
It is straight forward that the higher R&D investments are, the more consumers profit from 
R&D. Equation  (46) shows furthermore  that  consumers  profit  more  from manufacturer's  R&D 
investment, the lower the marginal cost levels of manufacturers (cu) and of retailers (cd) are, before 
the stage of R&D investment.  Beyond that,  we can show that  higher interbrand and intrabrand 
competition as well as higher consumer's maximum willingness to pay also yield higher benefit of 
consumers from R&D investments.
Proposition 4: Consumers profit even more from manufacturer's R&D investment, the higher their  
willingness to pay is and the higher interbrand and intrabrand competition among manufacturers  
and retailers are.
Proof: The derivative of consumer surplus with respect to a, γ, and with respect to β is: 
∂ΔCS
∂ γ
=
6 d γ(a−cd−cu)
(2−β)2(1+β)(2−γ)3(1+γ)2
+ 6d
2 γ(4−5 γ2+2 γ4)
(2−β)2(1+β)(4−γ2)3(1−γ2)2
>0
∂ΔCS
∂β
=
6 dβ(a−cd−cu)
(2−β)3(1+β)2(2−γ)2(1+γ)
+ 3d
2β(4−3γ2)
(2−β)3(1+β)2(4−γ2)2(1−γ2)
>0
∂ΔCS
∂a
= 2d
(2−β)2(1+β)(2−γ)2(1+γ)
>0
Since all derivatives are always positive for the assumed values of our model, the consumer 
surplus through process R&D of manufacturer h or retailer  i increases, the tougher interbrand and 
intrabrand competition are and the higher consumers' maximum willingness to pay is. □
This point can be interesting for the authorities,  e.g. in the cases where they have scarce 
means and have to decide which industry's R&D investments they want to subsidize. The higher  
consumer's maximum willingness to pay, the degree of competition among the firms within the 
industry, but also among the firms in the downstream market and the lower pre R&D marginal costs 
in both upstream and downstream market, the more would consumers profit ceteris paribus from 
higher R&D investments. Moreover, as it was mentioned in subsection 3.4, one should also keep in 
mind that  under certain circumstances, R&D can yield market exit of a firm in the vertically related 
market.
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5. Conclusion
Due to the assumed linear quadratic utility function, a change in degree of interbrand and/or 
intrabrand competition has a twofold effect on quantity. On the one hand, an increasing degree of 
competition  in  upstream  and/or  downstream  market  yields  lower  prices,  which  yields  higher 
demand.  On  the  other  hand,  the  linear  quadratic  utility  function  yields  ceteris  paribus  higher 
demand,  the  more  differentiated  manufacturers'  products  and  retailers'  services  are.  This  is  a 
reasonable assumption as because of higher differentiation in upstream or downstream market, a 
wider range of consumers can be served. As an example, when one manufacturer offers a car which 
is rather for the highway, while the competitor offers a city car, the total demand for cars are higher  
than the demand for two similar types of city cars. These effects cause the non-linear relationship, 
which was mentioned in the introduction, between the degree of competition among the firms in a 
market and the R&D incentives of the firms in the vertically related market.
We started a basic set up with two vertically related oligopoly markets, which contains both 
elements of interbrand and intrabrand competition as well as asymmetries in both upstream and 
downstream market. In Section 3, we introduced R&D investments and showed that asymmetries 
among  firms  in  any  market  are  dampened  by  vertically  related  firms.  This  finding  shows  an 
ambivalent effect of laws that forbid price discrimination in input markets in some countries such as 
France. Forbidding price discrimination abolishes the dampening effect found in this paper. This 
increases the R&D incentives because the firm's R&D efforts can not be “absorbed” any more by 
the firms in the vertically related market. Furthermore, it increases the allocative efficiency, since 
the wholesale price for the more efficient retailer sinks.  However, the elimination of the dampening 
effect harms the less efficient retailer. In extreme cases, this can lead to market exit of the less 
efficient  retailer,  whereas  the  same  retailer  would  be  able  to  remain  in  the  market  if  price 
discrimination would be possible. 
Another interesting result of this paper for competition authorities is that in vertically related 
markets,  similar  prices  not  necessarily  mean  a high  degree  of  product  substitution  and intense 
competition, but it can mean the exact opposite, namely a sign of highly differentiated products or 
services. Moreover, we showed that the R&D of a firm can harm under certain circumstances the 
less efficient firm in the vertically related market, if price discrimination in input market is allowed. 
We  also show that if a firm in  a bilateral duopoly setup invests in R&D, the firms in the 
vertically related market increase their margins. Beside that, the innovating firm does not take the 
positive externality effects of its R&D investments into consideration. Therefore, the existence of a 
vertically  related  mareket  with  imperfect  competition  usually  yields  to  R&D-underinvestments, 
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even without any direct vertical spillover of knowledge.
The model can be generalized in different ways. The assumption on agents' information (all 
manufacturers know the cost functions of both retailers and vice versa) is rather strong. Relaxing 
these assumptions  can modify some results.  This  paper  considers  a bilateral  duopoly.  One can 
extend this model to a case which has more than two firms either in upstream, or in downstream, or 
in both markets. Furthermore, other factors such as the possibility of resale-price maintenance can 
also be considered in future works.
This model  offers also the base for other research questions related to R&D in vertically 
related markets. For example the timing of a vertical integration can be crucial, as a firm's R&D 
investments have an effect on the vertically related firm's profits and therefore, on its market value. 
This is subject to future research.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Prices and quantities under Cournot competition:
The prices in the vertical  frame model  are p ih=p jh=a−
a 1
22−

12 chc g
24−2
for 
good  h and p ig= p jg=a−
a 1
22−

12cgch
24−2
for  good  g.  The  corresponding 
equilibrium  outputs  are q ih=q jh=
a
22−1
−
ch 2−
2−cg 
24−5 24
for  good  h and
q ig=q jg=
a
22−1
−
cg 2−
2−ch
24−524
for good g. 
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting (16) and (17) into (8) under the assumption ci = cj = cd yields
q ig=q jg=
a−cd−cu2−
2−22−2
− d 
2−24−524
. Setting the equation equal to zero  
and solving with respect to d leads to the threshold d=
(a−cu−cd )(1−γ)(2+γ)
γ . Since qig = qig 
sinks as d increases, d must be below this threshold in order that qig is positive. □
Appendix C
Proof of Proposition 2: From (19) and lemma 1 it follows that the retail price of good h decreases 
by
2d
4−22−
and retail price of good g decreases by
d 
4−22−
due to process R&D 
of manufacturer h. Since both terms increase with higher β and/or with higher γ, manufacturers and 
retailers pass through rates increase ceteris paribus the tougher they are in competition. 
Both the retail  prices  of  good h and of  good  g “react”  stronger  to  process  innovation  of 
manufacturer  h, the higher β and/or γ are, thus the higher the degree of interbrand and intrabrand 
competition are.    □
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1. Introduction
One of  the  instruments  that  firms  use  to  grow and  increase  their  sales  and/or  profits,  is 
expanding into new markets. Expansion into a new market can have several benefits for a firm: it  
can benefit from economies of scale, product portfolio diversification, increased revenues, reduced 
risks and so forth. 
However, any market entry usually needs some irreversible initial investments for advertising, 
building up a distribution channel etc, which might be higher than the benefits, and deter the firms 
from entering into new markets. Usually, firms' decisions about whether to enter into a new market 
or not, are based mainly on whether the profits through market entry cover the initial costs or not. 
Many market niches are served just because the costs for a firm to use an existing product and 
modify it for the new market are cheap enough to be less than the additional revenues from the new 
market.  For  example,  if  we  consider  a  car  producer,  the  costs  of  developing  a  platform is  a 
substantial part of the fixed costs of developing a new car model. Thus, once a car producer has 
spent the costs of developing a platform for one specific model, it uses this platform for different 
models which target other consumers. A very well known example is Volkswagen (VW), with its so 
called  “Modularer  Querbaukasten”  strategy  (MQB),  translating  from  German  to  “Modular 
Transversal Toolkit” platform. For example, the MQB it has recently launched will be shared by the 
firm's most selling model VW Golf, the more expensive Audi A3, the more modestly priced Skoda 
Octavia and even for cars of other sizes.1 One reason VW uses the MQB strategy is to decrease the 
additional costs to develop a product for a market niche and therefore, it allows VW to offer a  
broader range of vehicles across its many brands and enter into new market niches.
The focus of this paper is on another, more subtle aspect of the MQB strategy, and of market 
entry in general: As a firm – hereafter called “firm 1” – penetrates into a new market, it has some 
irreversible initial investments on the one hand, and higher total sales volume on the other hand. 
Assuming firm 1's product in the new market is similar to its existing products in the old market – 
in our example, VW generates the similarity through the MQB strategy – the higher sales volume 
through market entry yields higher incentives for firm 1 to invest in marginal cost reducing process 
R&D  (from  now  on  simply  called  “R&D  investments”).  Thus,  making  irreversible initial 
investments for developing a product, advertising, distribution channel and so forth to penetrate into 
a new market, can be used as a credible self commitment to higher R&D investments, which is 
observed by the competitor in the old market – hereafter called “firm 2”. If firm 1 and firm 2 have 
1 The Economist, April 20th-26th 2013, Special Report Cars Section, page 4. 
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similar marginal costs before the firms invest in R&D, firm 2 has a weaker position in the “race” for 
investing in process R&D. In this  case the optimal  strategy for firm 2 can be to invest less in 
process R&D, set higher prices and focus on its loyal customers in a differentiated market. Hence, 
by expanding into a new market (hereafter called “market N”), firm 1 increases its profits in the old 
market (called “market  M” from now on) through weakening its competitors and gaining a more 
dominant position in that market. To my knowledge, this strategic motive of market entry has gone 
unnoticed in  this  form in the previous  literature.  This effect  delivers  an explanation  why some 
niches are served even though they are too small or too competitive to allow firms to cover the 
irreversible initial costs for entering into those markets.
The mechanism described above works only when price discrimination is possible.2 However 
we  demonstrate  that  even  if  price  discrimination  is  not  possible,  market  entry  into  a  per  se 
unprofitable market can increase profits of firm 1 through a different mechanism: since firm 1 has 
to set the same price in market N (where it is a monopolist) and market M (where it competes with 
firm 2), market entry of firm 1 yields higher incentives to increase its unit price in order not to harm 
its  profits  in the new monopoly market.  Firm 2 – which is firm 1's competitor  in market  M – 
anticipates this, and sets in turn higher prices in market M as well. Thus market entry into market N 
softens  the competitor's  pricing  behavior  in  market  M,  and leads  therefore  to  higher  profits  in 
market M. 
Furthermore, we consider in this paper the influence of different competition regimes on the 
results and show that both under Bertrand and Cournot regimes, even though a market entry is not 
profitable per se, it  can be better for a firm to enter into that market. This is of course always the 
case when the profit gains in the old market are higher than the losses in the new market. Another 
point  that  will  be  considered  in  this  paper  is  how results  change if  the  firms  are  asymmetric, 
especially when firm 1 has higher marginal costs before the firms invest in R&D (hereafter called 
“pre-R&D” marginal costs). 
The  R&D literature  is  based  on  the  pioneering  works  of  Schumpeter  (1942)  and  Arrow 
(1962). Some of the central questions are how a change in the competitive environment such as 
market structure, or the regime of competition influences the R&D incentives of the firms. Several 
papers compare differentiated Bertrand vs. differentiated Cournout competition and find out that 
prices  are  lower (and hence outputs and total  welfare are higher) under differentiated  Bertrand 
competition.3 A number of papers such as Qiu (1997), Breton et  al.  (2004) and Hinloopen and 
Vandekerckhove (2007) show that outputs and welfare effect of R&D are higher under Bertrand 
2 In the following, the term price discrimination is used exclusively to refer to third degree price discrimination.
3 See for example Singh and Vives (1984) and Vives (1985)
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competition  if  interbrand  competition  is  not  very  tough.  There  is  also  a  number  of  papers 
considering  the  relation  between  degree  of  competition  and  intensity  of  R&D  investments 
empirically. For example Bertschek (1995) shows that tougher competition (represented by higher 
imports) causes more investments in innovation.4 We show that under certain circumstances, we can 
get some contrary results to the existing literature.
Other empirical papers such as Scherer (1965) and (1967), Link (1980), as well as Acs and 
Audretsch (1987) test  the two essential  Schumpeterian theorems – that innovation is stimulated 
through the existence of large firms and imperfect competition. Since the market entry of firm 1 
causes an asymmetry in the old market, and therefore firm 1 becomes the dominant firm in that 
market, our model is also related in the broader sense to the literature which treats dominant firm 
and Schumpeterian theories. Acs and Audretsch (1987), for example, find that large firms tend to 
have a  relative  innovative  advantage  in industries  which are capital-intensive,  concentrated and 
produce a differentiated good. Our specific model structure, with two separated markets connected 
through a firm which is active in both markets, leads to a different result. The innovative advantage 
of firm 1 increases with the degree of business stealing effect which, in turn, is higher the  less 
differentiated the goods are.
Brander and Spencer (1983) discuss in their model the strategic commitment effect of R&D 
investments in a symmetric two-stage Nash duopoly model. They show that, when R&D is used for 
strategic  purposes,  firms  invest  more  in  R&D than required to minimize  the total  cost  of their 
output, thus total costs would not be minimized for the output produced. This contradicts the results 
of nonstrategic models, such as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), where R&D is only used to minimize 
costs and cannot be used strategically, for example because R&D level and output are determined 
strategically. This extends the result of Dixit (1980) formally to the case of equal opportunity. 
In this paper, the expansion of firm 1 into a new market has a commitment element for the 
R&D investments of that firm.5 since in this game the firms invest in R&D before they sell their 
products, R&D investments are, similarly to the papers mentioned above, used strategically.  The 
model  relaxes  some  assumptions  of  the  previous  models  by  allowing  multiple  asymmetries  to 
appear simultaneously. The intimation effect caused by the higher R&D-commitment of firm 1 on 
firm 2's R&D investments is similar to that in Buehler and Schmutzler (2008). They show in their 
model  of  a  bilateral  duopoly that  vertical  integration  increases  own investment  and intimidates 
competitors from investing in process R&D. However, while in Buehler and Schmutzler the effect  
4    Nickell (1996) can also provide (weak) empirical evidence that competition increases firms' efficiency.
5 An element of “commitment” or “credible threat” appear in several papers, such as Eaton and Lipsey (1981) 
and Spence (1979), as well.
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is due to vertical integration, the intimidation effect in this model is due to market entry into a new 
market. 
Since  the  market  entry  causes  asymmetric  R&D investments  of  the  firms  which  yields 
different  post-R&D  marginal  costs  and  different  prices  of  firms,  this  paper  is  also  related  to 
dominant  firm literature.  Most of the dominant  firm papers are usually based on Forchheimer's  
model of price leadership with one dominant firm and one or several fringe firm(s). The papers 
regarding  dominant  firm  models  are  considering  various  aspects  of  competition.  Ono  (1982) 
considers a model where the dominant firm first sets the market price, the fringe firms set their  
outputs and the dominant firm serves the residual demand. Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) present 
a model where all firms use the price as strategic variable in a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly game. 6 
Tasnádi  (2000)  extends  the  model  of  Bertrand-Edgeworth  price  setting  game  to  a  game  with 
infinitely many firms. In a later model (2010) he also considers a quantity setting game based on 
Forchheimer.7 Wied-Nebbeling (2007) considers degree of heterogeneity in a Bertrand setting. She 
assumes  one dominant  firm with  constant  marginal  costs  and two fringe  firms  with increasing 
marginal costs. In her model, she demonstrates that fringe firms are not necessarily better off in a 
heterogeneous market. Other works – such as Cherry (2000) and Gaskins (1971) – consider the 
dynamic limit price setting problem of the dominant firm and the short-term versus long-term price 
setting behavior of the dominant firm.8
In this paper, the difference between dominant and fringe firm is not necessarily caused by 
different pre-R&D cost functions, but by different amounts of investment in process R&D caused 
by the market entry of firm 1 into a new market. The market entry of firm 1 makes it a dominant 
firm in the old market and some of the mentioned results presented above are contradicted under the 
assumptions of our model. Moreover, the model considers how factors such as degree of product 
homogeneity, costs of R&D and the size of the markets influence the profits and R&D investments 
of both the dominant and the fringe firm. In addition to the attribution to the literature mentioned 
above, the model reinforces some elements in the literature such as:9 
6   For an empirical paper on price leadership see Rassenti and Wilson (2004).
7 In an other paper Tasnádi (2004) shows that in a simple price-setting game with a large ﬁrm and many fringe 
ﬁrms the large ﬁrm does not accept the role of the price leader.
8 This subject is also discussed in some Industrial Organization books such as  Martin (1994), Shepherd (1997) and 
Tirole (1988). 
9 For example Athey and Schmutzler (2001) show these points in a dynamic oligopoly model with firms which 
are market leaders through low costs or high quality.
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– Investments are strategic substitutes.
– The  greater  ceteris  paribus  the  opponent's  cost  reduction  is,  the  lower  are  the  R&D 
incentives of a given firm.
– The lower a firm's post-R&D marginal costs, the greater are the incentives to invest.
The  next  section  introduces  into  the  model.  Section  3  shows  the  results  under  Bertrand 
competition when price discrimination is possible and section 4 compares these outcomes in the 
case where price discrimination is not possible. In section 5, we will consider the results under 
Cournot regime and section 6 concludes.
2. The model
I assume two separated markets, M and N, which differ in size. Both markets are represented 
by the same representative consumer, where the difference in market size arises from the different  
number of consumers in each market. There are  m consumers in market  M, and  n consumers in 
market N, where m > n. To be more precise, I assume that market N is small enough to be per se 
unprofitable for a firm to enter, thus the fixed costs of entry cannot be covered.10 
There exist two firms,  1 and 2, where firm 1 produces good 1 and firm 2 produces good 2. 
The products 1 and 2 are substitutes and the degree of substitution among them is represented by γ, 
where γ can vary among the wide range of independent goods (γ = 0) and perfect substitutes (γ = 1). 
Both firms are active in market M only. If any firm decides to enter into market N, its market entry 
involves some fixed investment F.  I assume that one of the firms – hereafter per assumption firm 1 
– enters into market N and is a monopolist there. Firm 2 decides to stay out of market N, because it 
would face competition against firm 1 if it would enter into that market. The market entry would 
not be profitable for firm 2, even if we consider the intimidation effect in the old market which was 
mentioned above. 
The structure of the model is illustrated in the figure below:
10 However, I assume that market N is large enough to be profitable for the first firm that enters into that market  
and is a monopolist there, if one adds the profits that it makes in market M through the intimidation effect of 
serving market N.
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The  timing  of  the  game  is  the  following.  In  period  t0 the  nature  decides  the  degree  of 
substitution among the goods of firms 1 and 2.11 In period t1 firm 1 decides whether it wants to enter 
into market  N or not. In period  t2 both firm 1 and firm 2 decide whether they want to remain in 
market M or exit the market, knowing their own and competitor's original cost functions and degree 
of product substitution γ. In Period t3 firms decide how much they want to invest in R&D and these 
R&D  levels  are  made  known  to  each  other.  In  period  t4 they  set  their  final  prices/quantities 
depending on the chosen R&D levels under Bertrand/Cournot regime and sell their products.
In this model, I consider how the outcomes differ depending on whether price discrimination 
is  possible  for  firm  1  or  not, and  I  compare  the  results  both  under  Cournot  and  Bertrand 
competition. I start with Bertrand competition whereby price discrimination is possible.
3. Bertrand Competition with price discrimination
In this section, I allow firm 1 to set different prices in markets M and N. I assume that firms 
compete à la Bertrand and the representative consumer in both markets have a linear  quadratic 
utility function which has the form U=a (q1+q2)−(q1
2+q2
2)/2−γ q1 q2 . As we see in the utility 
function, the consumers prefer ceteris paribus high product differentiation in this model. The utility 
function yields the following linear inverse demand function for each individual in market M:
11 I assume that γ is an exogenous parameter for the following reason: Even if firms influence the degree of  
product differentiation of their products by investing in marketing campaigns, product design etc, they still  
cannot  fully  control  how substitutable  the  product  at  the  end  will  be  for  consumers  comparing  to  other 
products in the market.
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p im=a−qim−γ q jm , ∀ i , j∈{1,2} where i≠ j  (1)
Hereby,  a is  the  maximum willingness  to  pay of  the  representative  consumer,  q1m is  the 
quantity sold in market M by firm 1 and analogously q2m is the quantity sold in market M by firm 2. 
If firm 1 enters into market N, the inverse demand function of each consumer for good 1 in market 
N is:
p1n=a−q1n  (2)
From (1) and (2) we can derive the quantities sold by firm 1 and firm 2 in market M (q1m and 
q2m) and the quantity sold by firm 1 in market N (q1n).
q im=
a(1−γ)− pim+ p jmγ
1−γ2
, ∀i , j∈{1, 2} where i≠ j
q1n=a− p1n
(3)
The profit functions of the firms have the following form:
π1=m( p1m−c1+x1)q1m+n ( p1n−c1+ x1)q1n−v
x1
2
2
−2 F  
π2=m( p2 m−c2+ x2)q2−v
x2
2
2
−F
(4)
The pre-R&D marginal costs of firms 1 and 2, thus their cost functions in periods t0, t1 and t2, 
are represented by  c1 and  c2 respectively.  The irreversible fixed cost of market entry – e.g. for 
advertising and building up a distribution channel – is denoted by F, and ν/2 represents how costly 
firms' R&D investments in period t3 are. The amount of cost reduction due to R&D investments of 
firm i is represented by xi. Thus the total costs of R&D investments of firm i is ν xi2/2 ∀i∈{1,2}.
The effectiveness of R&D investments is negatively correlated with the parameter v. The amount of 
marginal cost reduction is ordinally connected with the R&D investments of the firms. For this 
reason I use the investments in marginal cost reduction and R&D investments as synonyms in this 
paper in order to compare in which case R&D investments are higher or lower.   The model  is 
solved recursively, hence we start to solve the second stage by inserting (3) into (4):
π1=m
( p1m−c1+x1)(a(1−γ)− p1m+ p2 γ)
1−γ2
+n( p1n−c1+x1)(a− p1n)−v
x1
2
2
−2 F  
2=m
 p2−c2x2a 1−− p2p1
1−2
−v
x2
2
2
−F
(5)
Building the first order conditions from the profit functions in (5) with respect to the prices 
and solving them yields:
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p1m=
1
2
(a+c1− x1−
m(a− p2)γ
m+n (1−γ2)
)
p2 m=
1
2
(a (1−γ)+c2−x 2+p1γ)
p1n=
a+c− x1
2
 (6)
Inserting the prices in (6) into each other lead to the prices depending on x1 and x2:
p im=
a 2−−22ci−x ic j−x j
4−2
, ∀ i , j∈{1,2} where i≠ j
p1n=
ac−x1
2
(7)
After solving the last stage of the game, the optimal R&D investments of firms 1 and 2 (x1 
and x2) can be determined by inserting (7) into (5). Maximizing these profit functions w.r.t. x1 and 
x2,  and inserting them into each other  leads  to  the optimal  R&D investments.  By inserting the 
optimal  R&D investments into  (7) we get the prices depending only on external variables. The 
marginal cost reductions, prices, marginal costs and market shares of firms 1 and 2 depending on 
the degree of competition γ are simulated in the graphs below. The terms of the optimal amount of 
marginal cost reduction can be found in appendix A.
Graph 1, Left graph: Marginal Cost reductions of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) which are ordinally related to 
their R&D investments. Middle graph: post-R&D marginal costs of firm 1 (dot-dashed) and firm 2 (dashed) and  
prices  p1M (blue), p1N (purple) and p2 (orange). Right graph: market shares of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) in 
market M. All graphs depend on degree of competition γ. The parameter values of the graph are: a = 60, m = 0.6, 
n = 0.1, ν = 2, c1 = 30, c2 = 30.
In the simulation above, I assume  c1 =  c2 = 30, thus the firms have symmetric pre-R&D 
marginal costs. As we can see in the graphs, when degree of competition in market M is higher than 
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a certain threshold, there is a breaking point in the development of marginal cost reductions, prices 
and marginal costs. The reason for this breaking point is that if γ is above this threshold, firm 2  
decides to exit market  M in period  t2 and therefore, firm 1 can set monopoly prices in period  t4, 
instead  of  limit  pricing.  Since  firm  1  serves  2  markets,  it  has  higher  sales  and  thus  R&D 
investments of firm 1 are always higher than firm 2. The higher degree of substitution γ among 
goods 1 and 2 is chosen by nature in period  t0, the stronger are the following two countervailing 
effects on R&D incentives of the firms:12
– “Lowered demand effect” due to the assumed utility function of consumers. Demand lowers 
ceteris paribus when γ increases and thus both firms have less incentives to invest in R&D.
– “Reinforced business stealing effect” due to the better degree of substitution γ among the 
goods. This yields lower prices in the competitive market and stronger incentives for the 
more productive firm to invest in R&D.
As graph 1 demonstrates, the combination of the two countervailing effects act as follows: in 
the areas of low γ, the first effect – namely lower demand of consumers due to a higher degree of 
substitution among goods 1 and 2 – dominates. Therefore, a higher degree of competition leads to 
lower R&D investments and thus higher marginal costs and higher price of firm 1 in its monopoly 
market N, but lower prices of both firms in market M. Even though a higher γ causes, in this case, 
sinking R&D investments of the firms – and thus higher post-R&D marginal costs, both firms set 
lower prices in market  M due to tougher competition. This yields lower margins of both firms in 
market M.  Since firm 1 invests more in R&D, it has lower post-R&D marginal costs than firm 2.  
Thus if products are more homogeneous than a certain threshold, firm 2 exits market  M and thus 
does not invest in R&D any more. This is the breaking point of the graph (here γ ≈ 0.9143).
Only in the area where γ is below but close to the value of the breaking point, an increasing 
γ leads to higher R&D investments of firm 1. In all other areas where both firms are active in  
market M, a higher value of γ yields lower R&D investments of both firms. 
In the area where γ is above this breaking point,  firm 1 is a monopolist in both markets. 
Hence, firm 1 chooses the monopoly level of R&D investments and sets the monopoly price in both 
markets. In this model firm 1 does not need limit pricing when firm 2 is not active in market M due 
12  Note that when I mention higher or lower γ, I usually consider external changes of γ. As a possible extension 
to this model, one can assume a situation where the life cycle of a firm's product ends and it wants to introduce  
a new generation of that product into the market, knowing how the competitor's product is positioned. By  
giving a different image to the new generation of that product (for example through a different design), a firm 
can influence the optimal level of R&D investments of itself and its competitor and – as I show later in this 
paper – the prices and profits.
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to the timing of the model. As mentioned earlier, firms choose their amount of R&D investments,  
prices and marginal costs after knowing whether the other firm has exited market M in period t2 or 
not. 
The  next  graphs  simulate  R&D  investments,  prices  and  marginal  costs  in  a  different 
scenario, namely when firm 2 has a superior production technology, but faces financial constraints 
and cannot enter into market N. In this case firm 2 has significantly lower pre-R&D marginal costs 
than firm 1, so c2 < c1, but firm 1 commits itself to higher R&D investments through market entry.
Graph 2: Left graph: marginal cost reductions of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) which are ordinally related to  
their R&D investments. Right graph: post-R&D marginal costs of firm 1 (dot-dashed) and firm 2 (dashed) and 
prices p1M (blue), p1N (purple) and p2 (orange) depending on degree of competition, whereby c2 < c1. The parameter 
values of the graphs are: a = 60, m = 0.6, n = 0.1, ν = 2.8, c1 = 30, c2 = 28. 
In graph 2 each firm has a different advantage: by entering into market  N, firm 1 credibly 
commits itself to invest more aggressively in process R&D; firm 2 has lower pre-R&D marginal 
costs, thus its production technology is more efficient in the pre-R&D stage.13 In this simulation, if 
the goods are rather independent, then firm 1 invests more in R&D and decreases its marginal costs 
stronger than its competitor.  The more homogeneous nature chooses the goods in period  t0, the 
lower both firms' investments in R&D are (due to the “lower demand effect” in market M), and the 
lower the firms' prices are (due to the “Business stealing effect). However, as the goods become 
more  homogeneous,  firm 2's  superior  production  technology  gains  a  higher  importance  in  the 
competition. If the products are homogeneous enough, and a relative small size of market N as well 
as a relative significant marginal cost advantage of firm 2 are given, then the “power constellation” 
changes. In this case firm 1 has less incentives to invest in R&D due to technological advantage of 
13 Considering the case where firm 1 has lower pre-R&D marginal costs would simply reinforce the dominance of  
firm 1 and leads to similar results that we observed with equal pre-R&D marginal costs (c1 = c2). Therefore, we  
concentrate here on the more interesting case where firm 1 has financial constraints and therefore, it is firm 2 that  
enters into market N.
12
firm 2 and furthermore, firm 1 can even be driven out of market M. Analogously to the first graph, 
firm 2 sets monopoly price after the competitor is driven out of market M. Note that in contrast to 
the first graph, even though firm 1 is driven out of market M, it still invests in R&D. The reason is 
that firm 1 is still active in market N, where it is a monopolist.
The graphs below depict  how the firms'  R&D investments  depend on  m,  the number of 
consumers in market M, which determines the size of market M.
Graph 3: marginal cost reductions of the firms depending on size of market M under Bertrand competition with 
price discrimination. The parameter values of this graph are: a = 60, c1 = 36, c2 = 36, n = 0.3, ν = 3, γ = 0.4 (left 
graph) and γ= 0.75 (right graph).
If m is rather small, an increasing size of market M yields higher incentives of both firms to 
invest in R&D. However, a larger size of market M reinforces the firm's incentives to gain market 
share through lower prices, hence it has a similar effect like increasing business stealing effect. As 
we can see in the right graph above, if both γ and m are high, firm 1 invests aggressive enough in 
R&D to intimidate firm 2 from investing in R&D. In this case, a further growth of market M yields 
less R&D investments of firm 2 while firm 1 invests more in R&D. 
 
Proposition 1
An increasing size of market M can lead to lower profits of firm 2. This is the case when both  
the R&D costs ν and the size of market M are relatively high.
The proof is shown in Appendix B. □
As it  has  been shown in graph , both higher  m and  higher  γ yield  per  se  higher  R&D 
incentives  of  the  firms.  However  –  since  firm  1  created  a  self  commitment  to  higher  R&D 
investments – if the values of γ and m are high, a further increasing of m intimidates firm 2 from 
13
investing in R&D. Hence, firm 2 increases its R&D investments less aggressive than firm 1, or even 
decreases its R&D investments, if  m increases. That in turn leads higher post-R&D marginal cost 
disadvantage of firm 2 in comparison to firm 1. Therefore, if the combination of γ and m is high 
enough, a further rise of the number of consumers in market m can yield lower profits of firm 2.
4. Bertrand competition without price discrimination 
In this section, I change an assumption and allow arbitrage between the markets M and N. 
For simplicity,  I assume that there are no transportation costs. Thus, firm 1  cannot set different 
prices in markets M and N, and therefore p1m = p1n = p1. Inserting the demands from (3) into (4) and 
maximizing them w.r.t. the prices and solving them, results into the following optimal prices:
p1=
2mnac1− x1−ma−c2 x2−a m2 n2nc1− x1
2
4mn−m4n2
 
p2=
mn 1−22c2−2 x2c1−x1 a 1−m2n 2−
2
4mn−m4n2
(8)
Inserting  back  (8) into  (4) and maximizing  the  profits  w.r.t.  the  R&D investments,  and 
inserting them into each other yields the optimal R&D investments of the firms. The terms can be 
found in appendix C. The graph of simulation in this case (which has the same parameter values as 
graph 1 with equal pre-R&D marginal costs of firms 1 and 2) is very similar to that of the graph 1. 
However, in this graph, firm 2 is driven out of market M by γ = 0.9143 (vs γ = 0.8981 in the “price-
discrimination-case”). The reason why firm 2 is driven here out of market  M at a higher γ is that 
firm 1 has to set the same price in the market where it is a monopolist as in the market where it 
competes with firm 2. Hence firm 1 sets here ceteris paribus a higher price in market M (and sells 
less), but it sets a lower price in market  N (and sells more), than in the price-discrimination-case. 
Hereby, firm 1's higher price in market  M leads to a “higher” threshold of firm 2's market exit
(γ = 0.9143 vs γ = 0.8981).
As in graph 1, investment decisions are strategic substitute in the non-price-discrimination 
case as well. Thus, a firm's incentive to invest in marginal-cost-reducing process R&D is lower 
when the competitor is investing more in process R&D.
 Both firms know that firm 1 has higher R&D incentives  than firm 2 due to its entry into 
market  N. As the products become more similar, both firms'  R&D incentives decrease because of 
the lowered demand effect, however, the business stealing effect becomes more significant as well. 
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As in the previous section,  when business stealing effect  is already significant  (combination of 
values of γ and m is high), a further homogeneity of the products yields firm 1 using its strategic 
advantage and investing more in R&D, even though the demand in market M is ceteris paribus less. 
In this case, firm 2 invests less since R&D investments are strategic substitutes, and if competition 
is over a certain threshold, firm 2 can be driven out of market.
The  graphs  below  simulates  typical  price  setting  behaviors  of  the  firms  when  price 
discrimination is not possible:
Graph 4: prices of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) in Bertrand competition without price discrimination. The 
parameter values of the graph are: a = 60, n = 0.2, ν = 2.8, c1 = 30, c2 = 30, m = 1 (left) and m = 0.4 (right).
The higher degree of homogeneity the nature chooses in stage t0 for the goods 1 and 2, the 
more firm 1 faces two problems: the demand in market  M is ceteris paribus lower, and firm 1's 
optimal prices in markets M and N diverge more from each other due to the tougher competition in 
market  M. Thus, the unit price firm 1 chooses for both markets is more remote from the optimal 
prices firm 1 would have set in markets M and N if it could price discriminate. The lower demand in 
market  M is, the stronger are ceteris paribus firm 1's incentives to keep its price high in order to 
benefit from high margins in market  N where it is a monopolist. Hence firm 1's prices react “less 
elastically” than firm 2's prices on an increasing degree of competition in market M. 
As we can see in the right graph above, if goods are relatively independent and the size of 
market M is not large, then firm 1 sets lower prices because of its lower post-R&D costs due to its 
higher R&D investments. If competition is in the middle ranges, firm 1 prefers to set higher prices 
in  order  to  avoid  too  low  prices  in  market  N,  where  it  is  a  monopolist.  If  the  goods  are 
comparatively homogeneous, the business stealing effect gains a higher weight. In this case, since 
the prices are already relatively low due to tough competition, firm 1 uses its advantage through 
higher R&D investment for an aggressive price setting to gain more customers from firm 2, and 
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eventually even to force firm 2 to stay out of the market.14
The graphs below demonstrate how the amount  of marginal cost reduction,  and thus the 
amount of R&D investments, depend on the size of market M. Other than in graph 3, I assume here 
that firm 2 has a technological advantage in t0 – t2 , before the firms invest in R&D.
Graph 5: Marginal cost reduction of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) depending on the size of market  M. The 
parameter values of the graphs are a= 60, c1=30, c2=24, ν = 2, n= 0.2,  γ = 0.1 (left graph),  γ = 0.4 (middle graph) 
and  γ = 0.75 (right graph).
Intuitively, one would always expect from an increasing size of market M more aggressive 
marginal  cost  reduction  and  thus  higher  R&D  investments  of  the  firms.  However  in  the 
constellation simulated in the graph above – with firm 1 serving two markets and firm 2 having 
significantly lower pre-R&D marginal costs, but financial constraints that does not allow it to enter 
into market N – this is not always the case. While a larger size of market M always leads to higher 
R&D investments of firm 2, it only yields higher R&D investments of firm 1 if the products of 
firms 1 and 2 are relatively differentiated. Firm 2's advantage of lower pre-R&D marginal costs 
gains higher significance, the more homogeneous the products are and this causes more aggressive 
R&D investments of firm 2.15 In this case firm 1 prefers to invest less in R&D, sets a higher price 
and focuses rather on its  monopoly market  N  and its loyal  customers in market  M.  This yields 
higher “convergence” of firm 1's price to the monopoly price in market N and therefore lower R&D 
investments  of  firm  1.  If  degree  of  competition  is  high  enough  and  market  M is  already 
comparatively large, a further rise of of firm M 's size can even yield lower R&D investments of 
firm 1. 
As the graphs below shows, a rise of the R&D costs ν can lead to higher profits of firm 2. By 
14 Due to the timing of the model, this is an equilibrium in pure strategy. Firms decide in period t
2
 whether the stay in a 
market and produce, or exit the market.
15 This effect could be also observed already in graph 4, where firm 1 would even stay out of market M if the degree of 
product homogeneity was over a certain threshold.
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inserting the optimal prices and R&D level into (5), we get the profit functions depending only on 
external variables.  The graphs simulate two examples where higher R&D costs ν lead to higher 
profits of firm 2.
Graph 6: Profits of the firms when firm 1 enters into market N depending on costs of R&D investments ν under 
Bertrand competition without price discrimination.  The parameter  values of  this  graph are:  a = 60,  n = 0.3,
m = 0.8, γ = 0.6 , F = 40, c1 = 30, c2 = 30 (left graph) and c2 = 26 (right graph).
The dependency between firm 1's profit function and R&D costs ν is intuitive: the more 
costly R&D investments are, the less are the profits of firm 1. For firm 2, however, the relation is 
not intuitive at the first glance. As the graphs depict, the profit of firm 2 can rise as R&D costs ν  
increases.16 Since higher R&D costs lead to lower R&D incentives of both firms, the advantage of 
firm 1 – which is higher R&D investments – becomes less significant. This, in turn, makes firm 2 
relatively more competitive and thus increases its profits. It can even happen that, in case R&D is 
cheap enough, firm 1 becomes very aggressive in its R&D investments so that firm 2 can even be 
driven out of the market. The right graph depicts that higher R&D costs can yield higher profits of 
firm 2 even if firm 2 has lower pre-R&D marginal costs.
5. Cournot Competition
In this section, I will consider how the results change if we assume firms 1 and 2 compete à 
la  Cournot.  Since  Cournot  competition  and  product  differentiation  have  comparable  effects  of 
weakening competition among firms, I assume homogeneous products under Cournot competition 
(so γ = 1) and concentrate on the effects of other variables. The model is solved recursively by 
16 This is not the case if the goods are highly independent. In that case the profits of both firms decrease if costs of 
R&D increase.
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inserting (1) and (2) into (4) to get the profit functions of the firms depending on quantities qm1, qm2, 
and q2.
π1=m qm1[(a−qm1−qm2 γ−c1+x1)]+nqn1 [(a−qn1−c1+x1)]−v
x1
2
2
−2 F  
π2=m q2[(a−q2−qm1γ−c2+ x2)]−v
x 2
2
2
−F
(9)
Building the first order conditions from the profit functions in  (9) w.r.t. the quantities and 
inserting the quantities into each other yield:17
q1m=
a−2c1+c2+2 x1−x 2
3
 
q1n=
(a−c1+x1)
2
q2=
a−2 c2+c1+2 x2−x1
3
(10)
Hereby, the prices are: 
p1m=p2=
a+c1+c2−x1− x2
3
p1n=
(a+c1− x1)
2
 (11)
The optimal R&D investment of each firm can be determined by inserting (10) into (9) and 
maximizing both  profit  functions  w.r.t.  R&D investments.  This  leads  to  the  following reaction 
functions:
x1=
(a−c1)(8m+9n)+8m(c2−c1)−8m x2
9(2ν−n)−16m
x2=
4m(a−c−x1)
9ν−8m
(12)
Inserting the reaction functions into each other leads to the optimal R&D investments. For a 
better visualization, I simulate the optimal R&D investments depending on the size of market M.
17 Under monopoly, the quantity sold in market M is (q i m=(a−c)+x i )/2 and as competition mode changes to 
a duopoly Cournot competition, the quantity sold by each firms is: (q im=(a−c)+2 xi− x j)/ 3 ,∀ i , j∈{1, 2}.
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Graph  8: R&D investments of the firms under Cournot competition when price discrimination is possible. The 
parameter values of this graph are: a = 60, c1 = 36, c2 = 36, n = 0.3, ν = 3.
Analogous to the case of Bertrand competition, if market M is not large, an increase in size 
of market M simply leads to higher R&D investments of both firms. If the size of market M exceeds 
a certain level, then a further increasing size of market M leads only to higher R&D investments of 
firm 1. Similar to the case of Bertrand competition with relatively homogeneous products, firm 2 
invests less the larger market M becomes. The reason is the same as under Bertrand competition and 
is discussed in the previous section.
The quantities of the firms in equilibrium are: 
q1m=
3 ν(3n(a−c2)+6ν(a−2c1+c2)+8m(c1−a ))
32 m2+24 m(n−4 ν)+27ν(2 ν−n)
q1n=
3ν(8c1m+4c2 m+9 ν(a−c1)−12 a m)
32m2+24m(n−4ν)+27 ν(2ν−n)
q2=
6ν(3 ν(a+c1−2 c2)+(4 m+3n)(c2−a))
32m2+24m(n−4ν)+27 ν(2ν−n)
 
(13)
And the prices are:
p1m=p2=
8a m(4m+3n)−3ν(8m(2a+c1+c2)+3n(2a+c2))+18ν
2(a+c1+c2)
32 m2+24m(n−4 ν)+27ν(2 ν−n)
 
p1n=
a (8m−9 ν)(4m+3n−3ν)+3ν(9c1ν−4m(2c1+c2))
32m2+24 m(n−4ν)+27 ν(2ν−n)
(14)
As we can conclude from (12) and (11),  the quantities and prices of firm 2 depend also on
the size of market N, even though firm 2 is not active there. Therefore, any change in size of market
N influences price, quantity and R&D investment of firm 2.
In the following graph, I relax the assumption of perfect competition among the firms and let 
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γ be again within the interval [0,  1]. This allows me to compare the R&D investments of both firms 
under Cournot and Bertrand regime depending on degree of competition.
Graph 9: Comparison of the R&D investments of both firms when firm 1 is active in both markets under Cournot 
competition vs. under Bertrand competition depending on γ. The green (red) line represents x1 (x2) under Cournot 
competition, the  blue (orange) line represents x1 (x2) under Bertrand regime. The parameter values of this graph 
are: a = 60, c1 = 30, c2 =30, n = 0.1, m = 0.6, F = 30, ν = 2.
For a better comparability, I have used the same values in the graph above as in graph 1. It  
has already been shown that under Bertrand competition and for the assumed parameter values, firm 
2 is driven out of market  M if  γ is over the threshold 0.9143. Under Cournot competition, firm 1 
does not drive firm 2 out of market M for any value of γ. 
If  γ is above or around the threshold value 0.9143, firm 1 invests more and firm 2 invests 
less under Bertrand that under Cournot competition. For other values of  γ both firms invest less 
under  Bertrand  competition  than  Cournot  competition.  This  is  contradicting  with  the  standard 
results  in  the  literature  such  as  Qiu  (1997),  where  both  firms  invest  more  under  Bertrand 
competition. This standard result is only valid for high values of parameter γ when the constellation 
of our model is given.
5.1 An example for the (Un-)profitable market entry under Cournot competition
In order to prove that a market entry into an unprofitable market can be profitable, we need 
to know how much the profits of firm 1 are if it does not enter into market N. Then we compare the 
total profits of firm 1 with the case where it enters into market N. If firm 1 stays out of market N 
and c1 = c2 = c, then the firms are symmetric. In this case, their reaction functions are:  
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q i=
a−c−q j+x i
2
∀ {i , j }∈{1,2}  (15)
Inserting the reaction functions into each other results into the quantities: 
q i=
a−c+2 x i− x j
3
∀{i , j }∈{1,2}  (16)
Inserting back the quantities into the profit functions, and maximizing the profit functions 
with respect to the R&D investments yields the following optimal R&D investments:
x i= x j=
4 m(a−c )
9 ν−4 m
∀{i , j }∈{1,2}  (17)
The profits of both firms are:
πi=π j=
(a−c)2 m(9 ν−8 m)ν
(4 m−9ν)2
−F ∀ {i , j }∈{1,2}  (18)
Just as in the Bertrand case, firm 1 commits itself to higher R&D investments by penetrating 
into market N and paying the irreversible fixed costs F for brand advertising, building a distribution 
channel etc. This has an intimidation effect on firm 2's R&D investments and firm 1 faces a less 
efficient competitor in market M. Hence, the entry of firm 1 into market N yields higher profits in 
market M. 
The graph below illustrates inter alia how profitable firm 1's entry into market  N per se is 
and how it changes the total profits of firm 1 depending on the costs of R&D. The post-R&D cost 
functions, price and quantity of firm 2 are also simulated to make sure that firm 2 is not driven out 
of the market in the considered area.
Graph 10: Orange: price of firm 1 in market M. Dashed and dot dashed: post-R&D cost functions of firms 1 and 2 
Red: quantities sold by firm 2. Purple: additional profit/loss that firm 1 makes through entering into market  N. 
Blue: how much the total profits of firm 1 changes due to entry in market  N. Horizontal Axis: ν (parameter for 
cost of R&D/inverse productivity measure). The parameter values are: a = 60, c = 30, n = 0.1, m = 0.6, F = 52.
 
21
1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0

20
10
10
20
30
1,  1 , cxi, p
As we can see in the graph above, if ν is for example 1.1, firm 1 would make losses in 
market N if it enters into that market (purple line), however, the total profits of firm 1 increase (blue 
line). Inserting the parameter values and calculating the numerical results shows that market entry 
into market  N creates losses of approximately 2.1334 in that market. However, the market entry 
increases total profits of firm 1 by nearly 6.7776. Thus, due to the intimidation effect in market M, 
the profits of firm 1 increases by approximately 8.9110 in that market, which is more than four 
times of firm 1's loss in market N, and yields profitable entry into an unprofitable market.
 
6. Conclusion
This paper shows how in some cases, entry into a new market can be profitable even though 
the irreversible ex ante fixed costs of market entry for advertisement, distribution channel and so 
forth cannot be covered. When firm 1 enters into market N, it commits itself to higher production 
volume,  and  thus  higher  R&D  investments.  Since  the  firms'  R&D  investments  are  strategic 
substitutes, firm 1's commitment to higher R&D investments yields lower investments of firm 2 in 
process R&D. Firm 1 faces therefore a weaker competitor in market M through its entry into market 
N.  The R&D-advantage of firm 1 increases, the better the degree of product homogeneity and the 
larger the size of market M and/or market N is. This can even lead to market exit of firm 2, if the 
combination of firm 1's post-R&D marginal costs and degree of product substitution γ exceeds a 
certain level. 
We also consider another case where firm 2 has a pre-R&D cost advantage, but financial 
constraints which hinder firm 2 from entering into new markets. Therefore, it is firm 1, and not firm 
2, that enters into market N and creates the commitment to higher R&D. If firm 2's pre-R&D cost 
advantage  is  significant  comparing  to  the higher  R&D incentives  of  firm 1,  a  better  degree  of 
product homogeneity and a larger size of market M can emphasize the cost advantage of firm 2 and 
be disadvantageous for firm 1. If the products are homogeneous enough and the size of market N is 
relatively small, higher degree of product substitution can force firm 1 to exit from market M and 
concentrate on market N only.
Furthermore,  the paper shows how changes in variables influence R&D investments and 
profits of the firms. Among others, the paper demonstrates that higher costs of process R&D can 
lead to lower profits of firm 1, but to higher profits of firm 2. In addition, the paper shows that for 
some values of γ, both firms invest less under Bertrand competition than Cournot competition in 
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this model. This finding contradicts the standard results in the literature. 
We have shown that for high γ and m, a further incremental of Market M's size results into 
lower profits of firm 2, even though all other parameters, such as number of competitors and degree 
of product substitution, remain the same and the firms simply operate in a larger market.  We also 
have shown that – under Bertrand competition without price discrimination and significantly lower 
pre-R&D marginal costs of firm 2 – an increasing size of market M has two effects: it increases the 
incentives of both firms to invest in R&D and it increases the relative weight of firm 2's pre-R&D 
cost advantage. As m increases, both firms invest more in R&D. However, firm 2's increasing R&D 
investments  grow  faster  than  firm  1's  R&D  investments.  This  effect  is  stronger,  the  better 
substitutes the goods become.
This model  can provide an additional  explanation for the proliferation of firms into new 
market niches, which can be observed in some industries such as automobile production. Many 
manufacturers  – such as VW, GM, or Renault-Nissan – try to use an existing platform with a 
different chassis, and enter with this new model into a new market niche – or even “create” a new 
market niche. Since the different models share the same platform and the development of a platform 
is a substantial part of developing a new model, the different car models are still technologically 
similar products and meet one of the important assumptions of this model. As mentioned in the 
introduction, VW group's MQB-strategy is a prominent example for this phenomena.
Not only can this paper explain a market entry, that yields an intimidation effect on R&D 
investments  of  competitors  in  the  old  market;  it  can  help  us  to  understand  another  type  of 
unprofitable market entry as well. For example, the decision of Ferdinand Piëch, the former CEO of 
VW, to develop and produce the Phaeton, was not motivated by the self commitment  effect to 
higher production. One of the main intentions of Mr. Piëch's decision about entry of VW into the 
luxury car segment, was to support the VW brand image.18 A more prestigious image of the VW 
brand increases consumers' interest and their willingness to pay for other models of VW, which 
leads to higher profits for those VW-models and can (over-) compensate the loss through Phaeton.  
Since  an increasing  demand/consumers'  willingness  to  pay and lowering production  costs  have 
similar effects on the model-mechanisms, this paper can help us to understand also this type of 
“profitable entry into an unprofitable market”.  
18 See for example http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volkswagen_Phaeton#Development (19.08.2013)
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Appendix
NOTE: The terms in the appendix are copied from Wolfram Mathematica files. Therein, the terms
used are slightly different than in the paper: “g” is γ, “ca” is c
 1
 , “cb” is c
 2
 , “am” is a
 M
  and “an” is 
a
 N
 . 
Appendix A
Marginal  cost  reductions  of  the  firms  in  Bertrand  with  price  discrimination  in  the  area  of 
competition
 x1 = 
(a−c)(v (−2+g )(−1+g )(2+g )2(8−4 g2+a (−2+g )2(1+g )(2+g ))+2(−2+g 2)2 (−4+a (−4+g2)))
2v2 (−4+g 2)3(−1+g2)−2(−2+g 2)2(−4+a (−4+g 2))−v (−4+g 2)(−8(−2+g 2)2+a (−4+g 2)2 (−1+g 2))
,
x2 =
−(2 (a−c)(−2+g 2)(2v (−2+g )(−1+g )(2+g )2−(−2+g 2)(−4+a (−4+g 2))))
(2v2 (−4+g 2)3(−1+g2)−2(−2+g 2)2(−4+a (−4+g 2))−v (−4+g 2)(−8(−2+g 2)2+a (−4+g2)2(−1+g 2)))
Marginal cost reductions of the firm 1 as a monopolist when firm 2 exits market M:
x1M = 
(a−ca)(m+n)
(2v−m−n)
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1:
In order to show that an increasing size of market M can lead to lower profits of firm 2, I present 
the simulation of one example where this is the case. Inserting the prices – which are simulated in 
graph 1 – into the profit functions in  (5) leads to the profit of the firms depending on external 
variables. The graph below shows the plot of the profit functions of the firms depending on the size 
of market M.
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Graph: Profit of the firms depending on size of market M. The values of this graph are: a = 60, c1 = 30, c2 = 30, 
n = 0.5, ν = 2, F = 30,  γ = 0.3 (left graph) and γ = 0.5 (right graph)
As we can see in the right graph, for high γ and m, it can happen that a rise of Market M's 
size results into lower profits of firm 2. The combination of high γ and m yields a high business 
stealing effect through lower prices. As it has been shown in the paper, this yields very aggressive 
R&D investments of firm 1. As the left graph shows, this phenomena does  not appear, when the 
values of m and γ are low. □
Appendix C
Optimal R&D investments of the firms under Bertrand competition when price discrimination is not possible
x1 = 
−(c v (1+g)(−4+g2)(4 m(−2+g2 )+(−2+g)(−1+g)(2+g)(−n g+2 v (2+g ))))
(8 m2 (−2+g2 )2−2 m(n−4 v )(−4+g 2)(−2+g2)2−(n−2 v) v(−4+g2 )3 (−1+g2)) +
(a (−8m2 (−2+g2 )2+v (−4+g2)2(−1+g2)(n(−4+g+g2)−2 v(−2+g+g2))+2 m(8−6 g2+g4)(n(−2+g2)−2v (−3+g+2 g2))))
(8 m2(−2+g2)2−2m (n−4 v)(−4+g2)(−2+g 2)2−(n−2v )v (−4+g2)3 (−1+g2))
x2 = 
a+c+((a−c )(8 m2(−2+g 2)2−n v (−4+g 2)3 (−1+ g2)−2 m(8−6 g 2+g4)(n(−2+ g2)−2v (−2+g+g2))))
2 (8m2 (−2+g 2)2−2m(n−4 v)(−4+g 2)(−2+g2)2−(n−2v )v (−4+g2)3(−1+g2 ))
Appendix D
Price setting of the firms in Bertrand with price discrimination
 pam =
−(cv (1+g)(−4+g 2)(4 m(−2+g 2)+(−2+g )(−1+g )(2+g )(−n g+2 v (2+ g))))
(8 m2(−2+g2)2−2 m(n−4 v )(−4+ g2)(−2+g 2)2−(n−2 v ) v (−4+g2)3(−1+ g2))
+
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a (−8 m2 (−2+g2)2+v (−4+g2)2(−1+g2 )(n(−4+g+g2)−2v (−2+g+g2))+2 m(8−6 g 2+g4)(n(−2+g2)−2v (−3+g+2 g2)))
(8m 2(−2+g 2)2−2 m(n−4 v )(−4+g2)(−2+g2)2−(n−2v )v (−4+g 2)3(−1+g2))
pan = 
a+c+((a−c)(8m2 (−2+g 2)2−nv (−4+ g2)3(−1+g 2)−2m(8−6 g 2+g 4)(n (−2+ g2 )−2v (−2+g+g 2))))
2(8m2 (−2+g 2)2−2 m(n−4v)(−4+g 2)(−2+g 2)2−(n−2v)v(−4+ g2)3(−1+ g2 ))
pb =
−(2c v (−2+g)(1+g )(2+g )(2m(−2+g2)+(−2+g )(−1+g )(2+g )(−n+v (2+g ))))
(8m2(−2+g2)2−2m(n−4v)(−4+g 2)(−2+g2)2−(n−2 v)v (−4+g2)3(−1+g2))
+
−a (2m(−2+g2)+v (4−5 g 2+g4))(4m(−2+g2)−(−4+g2)(n(−2+g 2)−2v (−2+g+g2)))
(8m2(−2+g 2)2−2 m(n−4v )(−4+g2)(−2+g 2)2−(n−2v)v (−4+g 2)3(−1+g 2))
 
Appendix E
The graph below demonstrates  R&D investments  depending on γ,  the degree of competition in 
market M. 
Graph: Optimal R&D investments of the firms depending on degree of competition γ. The blue lines are the R&D  
investments of firm 1 and the orange lines are the R&D investments of firm 2. The parameter values of the graph  
are: a = 60, c = 30, n = 0.2, m = 1, ν = 2.8, c1 = 30, c2 = 30 (left graph) and c2 = 28 (right graph). Changing the 
parameter values does not change the “shape” of the graph.
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1.  Introduction
A central tenet in economics is that monopolization through market exit of a firm, or through 
merger and/or acquisition (M&A) of two or several firms, always yields lower consumer surplus 
unless there are efficiency gains through the M&A itself.1 Analogously, there is a common belief 
that higher competition, for example, through market entry of new competitors, always increases 
consumer surplus. For this reason, many of M&A attempts have been blocked by the competition 
authorities.
The object of this paper is to show that exceptions of this belief may appear in a setup where  
one of the firms – hereafter called “firm 1” – is active in two separated markets. We show that 
M&A (competition) in one of the markets – hereafter called “Market  M” – can benefit (damage) 
consumers  in the other market  where firm 1 is also active – hereafter called “market  N”. This 
benefit  (damage)  in consumer  surplus  of  market  N can be high enough to overcompensate  the 
damage  (benefit)  from  concentration  (competition)  for  the  consumers  in  market  M.  Hence 
competition (monopolization)  in market  M can lead to a loss (benefit)  in aggregated  consumer 
welfare in the overall markets. The magnitude of this effect depends on various factors such as 
number  and  wealthiness  of  consumers  in  the  markets,  firms'  marginal  cost  structures  before 
investing in R&D (hereafter also called firms' pre-R&D costs), degree of competition among the 
firms, whether price discrimination is possible or not, costs of marginal cost reduction when firms 
invest in process R&D, etc.2 We show what combination of all the factors mentioned above aid and 
abet a situation where concentration (competition) in market M leads to higher (lower) aggregated 
consumer welfare. 
An example of this phenomena could be observed over the past few years in the German cable 
market. There were two M&A-attempts – between Kabel Deutschland and Tele Colombus, as well 
as between Unity Media and Kabel BW – which have been blocked by the Bundekartellamt, the 
federal  cartel  authority  of  Germany.  The latter  M&A attempt  has  finally  been accepted  by the 
Bundeskartellamt. However, two other players in the market, Deutsche Telekom and Net Cologne, 
sued against this decision by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf, which is the higher regional court. 
In  its  decision,  the Oberlandesgericht  Düsseldorf  ordered to  reverse the merger  to  separate  the 
merged company again into the former separated firms. 
One important point, that probably have not received the importance it deserves, is that the 
merged company can invest a significantly higher amount in the quality of broadband than the two 
1    In this paper, the terms “merger” and “M&A” are synonyms and can be used interchangeably.
2 In this paper, the term price discrimination is used exclusively to refer to third degree price discrimination.
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separate firms. This can enhance the consumer surplus, in spite of an eventual rise in the prices 
through the merger, if the improvement of broadband quality is significant. 
Whether M&A leads to higher consumer surplus or competition harms consumers, they are the 
two  sides  of  the  same  coin  because  they  tell  the  reverse  story.  In  one  case,  the  number  of 
competitors in market  M decreases from two to one through a merger or acquisition. In the other 
case, the number of competitors in market  M increases in the same model setup from one to two 
through market entry of a competitor. Since these two scenarios are analogous, we will concentrate 
in chapters 2, 3 and 4 on the case where monopolization can increase the aggregated consumer 
surplus.  This  scenario  is  especially  crucial  for  Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC)  and  similar 
authorities in other countries such as the Bundeskartellamt in Germany. The situation discussed in 
the model can be found similarly in many industries (e.g. the automotive industry) where one firm 
is active with the same product – or a similar product – in a separated market. The terminology 
“separated market” can be understood here both as geographically separated, but also when simply 
the target-consumers are different within the same geographic area. In chapter 5, we briefly discuss 
the scenario of consumer harming competition by transforming the results of the paper into that 
scenario. Thereby, we also discuss how the timing of the game changes in that scenario.
There has already been a dialogue in the economic literature about whether, and if so, under 
which  circumstances  does  increasing  competition  amongst  firms  contribute  positively  to  total 
welfare. Based on the setup of Zanchettin (2006) with asymmetric firms,3 Kao and Menezes (2010) 
show that under Cournot competition, the parameter range for total welfare increasing merger is 
wider the better substitutes the products are, while M&A is never welfare enhancing under Price 
competition. The reason is that the efficient firm always produces more under Bertrand than under 
Cournot competition and therefore the efficiency gains through merger are lower under Bertrand 
competition.  Farrell  and  Shapiro  (1990)  show that  higher  total  welfare  through  the  merger  is 
possible, if a merger creates synergies.  In this model we show that even mergers which do not 
create static synergies can enhance aggregated consumer surplus.
Head and Ries (1997) model horizontal mergers between firms based in different nations, and 
specify the critical  minimum consumption share of a nation to  veto mergers  that  reduce world 
welfare. They argue that it is in national interest if the competition authority blocks most world 
welfare reducing mergers.  Some papers use the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 
1989 as a natural experiment. For example, Breinlich (2008) shows thereby that trade liberalization 
3  Zanchettin (2006) extends the model of Singh and Vives (1984), and shows that industry profit can be higher 
under Bertrand than under Cournot competition. This is the case if asymmetry among the firms are strong 
and /or the firms' products are weakly differentiated. 
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leads to a significant increase in M&A activity.
Lahiri and Ono (1988) show that under Cournot oligopoly, a marginal cost reduction in a firm 
with a sufficiently low share decreases national welfare and further more that national welfare even 
increases if a firm with a sufficiently low share is removed from the market. They argue that the 
elimination  of  minor  firms  improves  the  average  industry  efficiency,  and  that  may  exceed 
diseconomies of changes in market structure.
While  some papers argue that  in a monopolistically competitive market,   free  entry  can 
result  in  too little  entry compared to  the social  optimum,  other  papers  such as  Stiglitz  (1981), 
Spence (1984) and Tandon (1984) have found that too much competition is not desirable for total 
welfare. A very common argument is that since an entrant causes incumbent firms to reduce output, 
entry is more desirable to the entrant than it is to the society. The reason is that as an individual firm 
enters into the market, it only considers whether market entry is profitable for that firm. So it does  
not take the business stealing effect toward other firms into account. Mankiw and Whinston (1986) 
show that a bias toward excessive entry exists in homogeneous product markets combined with the 
existence of imperfect competition and business-stealing effect, while product diversity can reverse 
that bias.
There are also papers in the “reciprocal  dumping” literature which show that,  if there are 
transportation  costs,  increasing  competition  amongst  firms  through trade  may  have  adverse 
consequences on welfare under certain conditions. In particular, when there is two-way trade with 
almost  homogenous goods (“reciprocal  dumping”)  and important  barriers  to  entry,  the costs  of 
transporting  (nearly)  identical  goods  in  opposite  directions  can  dominate  the  positive,  pro-
competitive effect of trade. This effect was first shown in Brander (1981), and further developed in 
Brander and Krugman (1983).  Friberg and Ganslandt  (2008) show that reciprocal  dumping can 
result in lower total surplus rather than protectionism in a Cournot model for any degree of product 
differentiation, and in a Bertrand model when products are sufﬁciently close substitutes. Dei (1990) 
presents a model of reciprocal dumping with two markets and two firms which can decide to act as 
multinational companies rather than exporting their products to the other market. He demonstrates 
that  global  welfare  increases  through the  introduction  of  multinational  companies  whereby the 
larger market tends to lose and the smaller market tends to gain. 
Even though these papers  have shown that  excessive entry might  be  socially undesirable, 
market entry is usually considered profitable for the consumers unless there are transportation or 
trade costs. For example, Deltas et al. (2012) assume transport (or more generally trade) costs to 
show that collusive behavior among two firms can lead to higher aggregated  consumer surplus. 
They use a model with two firms whose products are differentiated. They assume both firms have a 
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home  markets  in  two geographically  separated  markets  and selling  the  product  of  a  firm in  a 
“foreign market” causes trade costs. To my knowledge, there are no papers in the literature that can 
show higher (lower)  consumer surplus through less (more) competition where no costs such as 
transport or trade costs – e.g. Deltas et al. (2012) or reciprocal dumping literature – are involved.
Salent et al. (1983) show in a Cournot model, that some exogenous merger may reduce the 
joint profits of the colluding firms. As they argue, it is not an equilibrium any more for the merged 
firm to produce exactly as its components did in the premerger equilibrium; in the new equilibrium, 
given unchanged output of other players, the merged firm reduces its production. They also show 
that exogenous mergers can still cause losses for the joint profits of the merging firms, even when 
the merger creates efficiency gains through scale economics, that are large enough to be socially 
profitable. In their model, a merger to monopoly is always profitable for the firms.
One of the contributions  of this  paper  is  to show that M&A can not only increase social 
welfare,  but also consumer surplus even if  there are no transportation costs, trade costs and no 
efficiency  gains  through  M&A.  Moreover,  we  show  that  even  a  merger  to  monopoly  can  be 
consumer welfare enhancing. Furthermore, this paper shows that competition in market M can harm 
consumers in market  N in both cases when the firms have the same or different pre-R&D cost 
structures.
The next section describes the model. In section 2.1 we consider the monopoly case which 
helps us as a benchmark to measure how aggregated consumer surplus changes due to M&A of 
firms 1 and 2. Section 3 considers the case where price discrimination is possible and thus firm 1 
can  set  different  prices  in  markets  M and N.  Section  4  shows  how  results  change  if  price 
discrimination is not possible and Section 5 concludes the results.
2. The Model
Consider  two  markets,  M and  N,  which  are  separate  from  each  other.  There  are  m 
representative consumers in market M, and n representative consumers in market N. There is a firm, 
called “firm 1”, which is active in both markets. Now assume that there is another firm, hereafter 
called “firm 2”, which is only in market M. There can be different reasons why firm 2 is not active 
in market N. One possibility is that market N is too small to be profitable for a second firm to enter 
into that market.4 Another possibility is that the government of country  N protects the domestic 
4 We assume here that market  N is small enough, that even if we consider the effect which is explained in Saboori 
Memar (2013), market entry is still unprofitable. That paper shows how market entry into a per se unprofitable 
market can become profitable under certain circumstances, if we consider the profit increasing feedback effect of 
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firms  against  foreign competitors.  Another  possibility is  that  firm 2 faces  capital  restraints  and 
therefore can not pay the fixed costs of market entry into market N. 
This structure is similar to the situation in the previous paper of this dissertation,  Saboori 
Memar  (2013)  “Profitable  Entry  into  an  unprofitable  market”,  when  the  firm has  entered  into 
market N. Hereby, firm 1 competes with firm 2 in market M, while it is a monopolist in market N. 
The basic structure of the model is illustrated in the following draft:
The parameter γ represents the degree of competition which can vary from independent goods 
(γ = 0) to perfect substitutes (γ = 1). We assume that firms can not control the taste of consumers 
concerning how close substitutes the goods are, thus the degree of substitution is an exogenous 
parameter.  The  representative  consumer  in  each  market  has  a  standard  linear  quadratic  utility 
function in the form of:
U k=ak (qi+q j)−
qi
2+q j
2
2
−γ qi q j , where i , j={1,2}∧i≠ j , k∈{M , N } (1)
There  are  fixed costs  of  market  entry  F.  The consumers'  maximum willingness  to  pay in 
market M is denoted by aM and in market N by aN. Hence a difference in market size can arise both 
from the different number of consumers and from different willingness to pay of the representative 
consumers in each market. The time structure of the model is as follows: In t0 nature decides how 
substitutable the products of firm 1 and firm 2 are. In stage t1, each firm decides, for the given γ and 
under common knowledge about the own and competitor's cost structure, whether or not they want 
to  acquire/merge  with  the  other  firm,  and  the  authorities  decide  whether  or  not  to  allow  the 
acquisition/merger. In stage t2, each firm decides whether it wants to stay in the market or to exit the 
market, whereby market exit is free. In stage t3, firms set the amount they want to invest in process 
market entry into the old market.
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Firm 1 Firm 2
Market N Market M
γ
R&D. In stage t4, firms set their final prices/quantities depending on the mode of competition.5
The model is solved recursively. In stage 4 the firms maximize their profits with respect to the 
market prices. The firms' profit functions are:
π1=m( p1−c1+x1)q1M+n ( p1n−c1+ x1)q1N−v
x1
2
2
π2=m( p2−c2+x2)q2M−v
x2
2
2
 (2)
The price of firm i in market k is denoted by pik, the marginal costs by ci, and qik denotes the 
quantity that firm i sells in market k for all i∈{1,2}, k∈{M , N }. The amount of cost reduction 
due to R&D investments of firm i is represented by xi and v/2 is an inverse measure for productivity 
of R&D, hence firm i's total costs of R&D is νxi2/2 ∀i∈{1,2}. In order to show that consumer 
welfare increases through merger, we first consider the benchmark-case where firms 1 and 2 are 
merged to firm 12, and act as a monopolist in both markets.
2.1 Firm 1 as a monopolist in both markets
In  this  part  we assume  that  there  is  an  M&A between  firm 1  and  firm 2.  The resulting 
monopolist  is  called  hereafter  firm  12.  The  results  are  used  later  as  benchmark  to  show that 
consumer welfare increases due to M&A of the firms. Since the merged firm faces ceteris paribus a 
higher demand than a firm under competition, it invests more in process R&D and has a lower post-
R&D cost structure than the firms under competition. The lower marginal costs yield lower prices 
of the merged firm. Hence, in circumstances where the benefits of competition are weak for the 
consumers – for example when the competing firms have highly asymmetric post-R&D marginal 
costs – M&A of the competitors can yield higher consumer surplus. 
The merged firm has different possible strategies after the merger. It can continue with the 
status quo, which is offering both goods in market  M and only product 1 in market  N (hereafter 
called “status-quo strategy”). Alternatively,  the merged firm can close one production plant and 
offer  only  the  good  with  lower  costs  to  the  consumers  in  both  markets  (hereafter  called
“one-product strategy”).6  
5 The timing of the game in stages t1 and t2 differs if we consider the scenario where an entry of firm 2 into 
market N leads to lower aggregated consumer welfare. In this scenario, firm 2 decides in stage t1 whether to 
enter in market M or not. In stage t2, firm 1 decides whether or not to exit market M as a reaction to firm 2's 
market entry. The timing of the two scenarios in stages t0, t3 and t4 are identical.
6  The merged firm would not follow the strategy of offering both goods in both markets by introducing good 2 
into market N. An assumption of this set up is that, when the two firms are not merged and firm 1 is active in 
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If firm 12 chooses the status-quo strategy, the consumers in market M face a higher variety of 
goods  compared  with  the  one-product  strategy.  Hence,  due  to  the  assumed  consumers'  utility 
function, their aggregated demand for both products is ceteris paribus higher under the status-quo 
strategy. However, offering a second product in market M yields lower demand from consumers for 
the first product. That, in turn, yields lower R&D investments of firm 12 in production of the first  
product and therefore higher post-R&D marginal costs of product 1. Moreover, the monopolist has 
higher fixed costs for advertising and distributing two products in market M. 
This paper also aims to identify typical circumstances, where M&A yields higher consumer 
surplus. The merged firm usually chooses the one-product strategy over the status-quo strategy 
except in cases of extremely differentiated products. For this reason, we concentrate on the one-
product strategy in this paper, however, we show in appendix A that M&A can also yield higher 
consumer surplus if firm 12 follows the status-quo strategy. There are mainly two reasons why we 
rather focus on one-product strategy case in this paper. Firstly,  because we can show that even 
though there is a monopolization  and a loss of product variety in market  M,  consumer welfare 
increases. Secondly, according to the utility function of the consumers, their utility is ceteris paribus 
lower, the less the number of offered products are.
As we consider the results throughout the paper both with and without the possibility of price 
discrimination, we consider these two cases for the monopolist as well. We calculate for both cases 
of price discrimination (PD) and non-price discrimination (NPD) what prices, quantities and level 
of R&D the monopolist chooses and how much the aggregated consumer welfare is.
We assume that the merged firm has the pre-R&D marginal costs c12, sells the quantity q12M in 
market M and q12N in market N, and sets the price p12 (in the NPD case), respectively sets the prices 
p12M in market M and p12N in market N (if PD is possible). The profit function of the monopolist is:
πM=m ( p12−c12+x12)(q12M)+n( p12−c12+x12)(q12N)−v
x12
2
2
, if PD is not possible
πM=m( p12M−c12+x12)q12M+n( p12N−c12+ x12)q12N−v
x12
2
2
, if PD is possible
(3)
Analogous to the case where firms 1 and 2 compete, the amount of cost reduction due to R&D 
investments of firm 12 is represented by x12 and v/2 is the inverse productivity of R&D, hence firm 
both markets, firm 2 would not enter into market N, because market N is too small to cover firm 2's costs of 
market entry. When the two firms are merged, the profit losses of firm 1 in market N due to entry of firm 2 
into that market are internalized. Due to this “Cannibalization-effect”, a market entry causes even higher  
losses for firm 12 than market entry of firm 2. Hence, it is never profitable for the merged firm to introduce 
product 2 into market N.
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12's total R&D-investments are ½ νx122. 
The monopolist faces the following demand function in each market:
q12K=aK−p12K , ∀K∈{M , N } , if PD is possible and 
q12K=aK−p12 , ∀K∈{M , N } , if PD is not possible
(4)
The model is solved recursively. By inserting (4) into (3) and deriving the first order condition 
therefrom  with  respect  to  either  prices  or  quantities,  we  get  the  following  monopoly  prices 
depending on the monopolist's level of cost reduction x12:
p12K=(a K+c12− x12)/2 , ∀K∈{M , N } , if PD is possible and
p12=
aM m+a N n+(m+n)(c12−x12)
2(m+n)
, if PD is not possible.
(5)
Inserting  (5) into  (2) and  maximizing  with  respect  to  x12 we get  the  optimal  amount  of 
marginal cost reductions x12 and thus the optimal amount of R&D  investment (which is ν x122/2):
x12=
(aM−c12)m+(a N−c12)n
2ν−m−n
,  both if PD is possible or not ∀m+n<2 ν (6)
At the first glimpse it might not appear intuitively why x12 is the same for both cases of PD and 
NPD. However, inserting (5) into the quantities in (4), and comparing the quantities in the PD case 
with the quantities in the NPD case, shows that the aggregated quantities sold by the monopolist are 
equal.  Therefore,  the  monopolist  invests  the  same amount  in  process  R&D independent  of  the 
possibility of price discrimination.7
Inserting now (6) into (5) and (4) leads to the prices and quantities depending only on external 
variables. By inserting the prices and quantities into the consumers' utility functions and subtracting 
consumers' costs, we can get the aggregated consumer surplus in both markets:
CSMN=
(aM m−aN m+2 ν(aN−c12))
2
8(m+n−2 ν)2
+
(aM n−aN n−2 ν(aM−c12))
2
8(m+n−2 ν)2
, if PD is 
possible, and
CS MN=
((aM−aN )m(m+n)−(aM m+c12(m+n)−aN (2m+n))ν)
2
2(m+n)2(m+n−2 ν)2
+
((aM−a N)n(m+n)+(a N n+c12(m+n)−aM (m+2n)) ν)
2
2(m+n)2(m+n−2 ν)2
, if PD is not possible.
(7)
After solving the monopoly scenario, we can now consider the cases where firms 1 and 2 
remain competitors and do not merge, and compare the results with this monopoly scenario.
7 This has been shown similarly in Pepall et al. (2008) and other sources as well.
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3. Price discrimination is possible
In this section we will consider the case where firm 1 is a monopolist in market  N, while it 
competes with firm 2 in market M, and can set different prices in markets M and N. In section 4, we 
compare how results change if firm 1 cannot price discriminate between markets M and N.
The derivative of the utility function of the representative consumer in (1) yields the following 
demand for products 1 and 2:
q iM=aM− piM−q jM γ , ∀i , j∈{1, 2}, where i≠ j in market M, and
q1N=aN− p1N in market N.
(8)
Inserting the demands into each other and solving with respect to q1 and q2 leads to:
q iM=
a M (1−γ)− piM+p jM γ
1−γ2
, ∀i , j∈{1,2}, where i≠ j in market M, and
q1N=aN− p1N in market N.
(9)
We  get  the  price  reaction  functions  of  the  firms,  by  inserting  (8) into  the  firms'  profit 
functions in (2) and maximizing the results with respect to the prices. Solving the equation system 
with the price reaction functions yields the optimal prices depending on marginal cost reductions x1 
and x2:
piM=
aM (2−γ−γ
2)+2(ci−x i)+γ(c j−x j)
4−γ2
,∀i , j∈{1,2}, where i≠ j in market M ,
and p1N=
a N+c1−x1
2
 in market N.
(10)
Inserting  (8) and (7) back into the profit functions in  (2) and maximizing with respect to  x1 
respectively x2 yields the optimal amount of marginal cost reductions of the firms, which is directly 
related to the R&D investments. By Inserting the optimal x1 and x2 into the prices and quantities we 
get  the  equilibrium prices  and quantities  and we can  also  simulate  the  consumer  welfare.  The 
following graphs compare the marginal cost reductions of firms 1 and 2 (left graph), as well as 
consumer welfare in market  N (right graph), before and after M&A in market  M. The degree of 
product differentiation γ is represented on the horizontal  axis. In order to exclude the effect of 
asymmetric  consumers'  maximum willingness  to  pay and asymmetric  pre-R&D marginal  costs, 
these parameters are set symmetric in these graphs. This allows us to concentrate on how other 
effects such as degree of competition can lead to higher CS under monopoly. Later in this section 
and  in  section  4,  we  also  consider  the  effect  of  asymmetric  maximum  willingness  to  pay  of 
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consumers and asymmetric pre-R&D marginal costs. 
Graph 2, Left: Marginal cost reduction of firm 1 (blue) and firm 2 (orange) when firms 1 and 2 compete in market M. 
For comparison: in the monopoly case, the marginal cost reduction of the monopolist is 20. Even though the graph 
simulates  just  x1 and  x2,  the  graph  also  represents  ordinal  the  R&D  investments,  since  R&D  investments  are
ν xi
2/2∀ xi∈{1, 2}. Right:  Comparison of  consumer  welfare  in  market  N,  when firm 1 is  a  monopolist  in  both 
markets (blue line), versus when the firms 1 and 2 compete in market  M (orange line). The parameter values of the 
parameters in both graphs are: aM = aN = 60, m = 1, n = 0.6, ν = 2, c1 = 30, c2 = 30.
As we can see in the left graph, if the pre-R&D marginal costs of firms 1 and 2 are similar,  
firm 1 always invests more aggressively in R&D than firm 2 since it serves both markets, while  
firm 2 serves market M only. For this reason, firm 1 has ceteris paribus lower post-R&D marginal 
costs than firm 2. If the two firms' products are more homogeneous than a certain threshold, firm 2 
would make losses if it stays in market M and therefore it decides to exit that market in stage t1.8 In 
the area which is above this threshold, firm 2 exits market M in stage t1 and firm 1 can simply act as 
a monopolist in stages t2 to t4. Hereby, the prices, quantities and marginal cost reductions of firm 1 
is like the monopoly case, which has been already explained in section 2.1.
The right graph demonstrates what the main source of higher CS through monopolization is. 
Monopolization in market M leads to a higher demand of product 1 and thus higher investments of 
firm 1 in process R&D. If γ is in the low range, this yields lower post-R&D marginal costs and 
ceteris paribus lower price of firm 1 in market N. Hence, if products of firms 1 and 2 are not close 
substitutes, M&A in market  M yields higher consumer surplus in market  N.9 However, a higher 
degree of substitution among the goods also means higher business stealing effect, which increases 
firm  1's  incentives  to  use  its  post-R&D  cost  advantage  to  capture  more  of  the  competitor's 
consumers through lowering its prices. Therefore, if the value of γ is high enough to be below, but 
8 The value of this threshold depends on other variables such as market sizes, firms' cost structures and how costly 
marginal cost reductions are. In this graph this threshold is by approximately 0.78.
9 Whether the value of γ is low/high depends also on other values such market sizes.
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close to the threshold which leads to market exit of firm 2, M&A does not enhance aggregated 
consumer welfare.
 For  firm  2,  an  increasing  degree  of  substitution  causes  the  opposite  effect:  firm  2  is 
intimidated  from investing  in  R&D,  because  it  faces  an  aggressive  competitor  which  has  the 
advantage of self-commitment to higher R&D investments and lower post-R&D marginal costs. 
Hereby, firm 2 prefers to lower its sales volume and concentrate on its loyal customers. A further 
increasing γ can even yield market exit of firm 2 in stage t1, since it becomes unprofitable for firm 2 
to compete with firm 1.
3.1 Introducing asymmetries 
In the previous graphs, the representative consumers in both markets have the same demand 
function for the goods. Hence a difference in the market sizes arises in the last graphs only by 
different number of representative consumers in the markets. After knowing what effect degree of 
product differentiation γ has, in this part, we add two more asymmetries to the model. The first 
asymmetry  we introduce  is  different  types  of representative  consumers  in  each market  through 
different maximum willingness to pay (aM  for consumers in market  M and  aN for consumers in 
market N). Thus, the market sizes do not differ any more only by number of consumers, but also by 
the “wealth” of the representative consumer in each market. 
The other asymmetry introduced in this section's simulations regards the firms. In this section, 
we consider firms with different pre-R&D marginal costs, thus different cost structures before R&D 
investments.  This  way,  we  can  analyze  how  firms  with  different  production  technologies  can 
compete with each other. The assumption that firm 1 has lower pre-R&D marginal costs than firm 
2, would simply reinforce firm 1's advantage and therefore leads to similar results as those we 
already observed in the previous chapters. For this reason, we focus here on the more interesting 
case where firm 2 has a pre-R&D cost advantage.10 In This case each firm has an advantage in 
comparison  to  its  competitor.  Depending  on  the  parameter  values,  the  model  can  result  into 
different scenarios: a dominant-firm-game with either firm as dominant player and the other one as 
fringe competitor, or, in rather rare cases, two firms with different technologies, but the same post-
R&D marginal costs.
We assume that the merged firm 12 follows the one-product strategy, closes the plant with 
10 As an example, one can consider a former state-owned monopolist, which now faces competition in some areas of  
its market. Since the competitors are entrants, they use a new technology, and have therefore a different technology 
with lower pre-R&D marginal costs.
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higher production costs, and serves both markets through the production facility with lower pre-
R&D marginal costs. By analyzing the simulation we try to show under which circumstances an 
M&A can possibly lead to higher consumer welfare, and therefore, a permission for the M&A from 
the competition authorities can rather be achieved.11
In order to understand why CS can be lower under competition than under monopoly, we need 
to analyze what effects does M&A have. The impact of M&A on consumer welfare in market N has 
already been explained above: firm 1 invests more in process R&D, its price in market N decreases 
and consumer welfare in that market increases. In market M, however, the M&A has several effects 
which impact consumer welfare in contrary directions.  On the one hand, changing the mode of 
competition from duopoly to monopoly decreases consumer welfare in market  M because of both 
monopoly pricing and the loss in product variety. On the other hand, the damage to consumers in 
market M through M&A is dampened, because the remaining monopolist has lower marginal costs 
since it  uses the more efficient  plant  and also invests  more in R&D than separate  firms under 
competition. Thus the monopolist has lower post-R&D marginal costs than the former competitors. 
Obviously, if consumers in market N gain more from the M&A than consumers in market M lose, 
does M&A lead to higher aggregated CS.
The table below summarizes the results of the simulation and demonstrates what the typical  
situations are, whereat the aggregated consumer welfare increases through M&A in market M. We 
try to illustrate the complex relationships of different variables of the Mathematica-simulations in 
this table. The signs and legends are explained below the table, followed by an explanation of the 
results.
Note that low, medium or high ranges are mentioned for some parameters below. The value of 
no parameter can be negative, so zero is the lower boundary for most of the parameters. The lower 
boundaries for aM and aN are straight forward since their value can not be lower than the firms' post-
R&D marginal costs. The lower and upper boundary for γ are rigid, since γ ranges per definition 
between zero (monopoly) and one (perfect competition). If 2  ν is less than m+n, the productivity of 
R&D is too high and the results are not defined. Therefore, the lower boundary for ν is ½ (m+n). 
The question whether ν is high or low can only be answered when it is set in relationship with the 
combined number of consumers in the two markets M and N. Therefore, the values of ν, m and n are 
“tied” together. For example, by low relative costs of R&D (respectively high relative productivity 
11   The primary goal is more concentrated on ascertaining the typical conditions under which higher CS under 
monopoly is given, rather than where the highest difference between the aggregated CS under monopoly  
versus under competition is. In other words, we focus in this analysis rather on the “wideness” than on the 
“depth” of higher CS under monopoly in the cases where these two elements are contradicting each other. 
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of R&D), we mean when  ν is closed to but above its lower boundary ½  m+n. Analogously,  the 
upper boundary of the combined market size m+n is 2 ν.
The typical cases of higher CS through monopolization differ depending on which firm has 
higher pre-R&D marginal costs. The simulations show that, if firm 1 has approximately equal or 
lower pre-R&D marginal costs than firm 2 (right column), monopolization leads in fewer cases to 
higher  consumer  surplus.  But  if  firm  1  has  higher  pre-R&D  marginal  costs  (left  and  middle 
column), the typical circumstances of higher CS through M&A depend on the relative number of 
representative consumers in market N. The reason lies in an immediate positive effect of R&D for 
the consumers in market N, which will be explained below in the specific explanation of marginal 
costs  c1 and c2. Therefore, typical circumstances of higher CS through M&A change significantly 
depending on n. For this reason, we distinguish in this case between high and low n, which depends 
on m and ν, subject to the restriction m+n<2 ν .
Comp. mode
Parameter 
  PD, low n
  c1  >c2
  PD, high n
  c1  >c2
PD 
c1 < c2
γ   ≠ ↑   ≠ ↑   ≠ ↑
ν   ≠↑→n*   → n(+m)*   ↓→ (n+m)/2 **
aM   ↓ ***   ↓ Necessary Condition   ↑
aN  ○****   ≈→aM   ○
m   ≠ ~   ↓   ↑ Necessary Condition
n .∩ . .∪ .   ↓, because high m is necessary
  condition and v > (n+m)/2
Table I: Which combinations of parameters lead to a situation of higher consumer welfare after 
M&A if price discrimination is possible and the merged firm follows the one-product strategy.
* The value of parameter v needs to be relatively similar to n in order to have higher consumer surplus under  
monopoly. This is not meant in absolute number, but in relative term. Thus if n is high, then a high value 
of v provides rather a favorable situation.
** ν should be as low as possible, however the condition ν>(n+m)/2 should not be violated. 
*** A high aM can only be compensated by a significantly lower c2 than c1, extremely low v, or significantly 
lower m than n. 
****  The value of aN has little significance on the probability of CS-Enhancing merger
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Explanations of the signs and legends in the tables:
↑ /↓/ ~ : The parameter should be in the high/low/middle ranges. 
aN ≈ → aM : The parameter value should be close to another parameter (here:  aN should be close to 
aM).
≠ ~ / ≠↑ / ≠↓: The parameter value should not be high/should not be low/should be either low or high.
 ○: Relatively irrelevant because even significant changes in the value brings only insignificant
changes in the result
.∪ .( .∩ .) : There is a U-shaped (adverse U-shaped) relationship between the parameter value, and the
probability of consumer-welfare-Enhancing 
Interpretation of the table and analysis of each single parameter
a) General explanation for parameters γ and ν for all tables in this paper:
Degree of product differentiation γ
The most straightforward relationship is regarding γ, the degree of competition among the 
firms under duopoly. In order to have higher CS under monopoly, the value of γ should be in the 
middle ranges or in the low ranges, depending on the other parameters. If the goods in market M are 
rather differentiated, then M&A in market M does not have a significantly negative effects for the 
consumers  in  that  market.  Thus,  the  positive  effect  of  lower  post-R&D marginal  costs  of  the 
remaining monopolist outweighs the negative effects of eliminating competition, so M&A rather 
yields higher consumer surplus. This is true for all the cases that are presented in both tables I and 
II.  Furthermore,  when firms  are  under  competition,  γ  should  not be around or  higher  than the 
threshold where firm 2 would exit from market M in stage t1.
Costs of Research and development ν  
In general we can say that higher ν leads to a less favorable situation for higher CS through 
M&A. Since consumer-surplus-enhancing M&A is based on the effect of higher R&D incentives of 
the newly formed monopolist,  higher costs of R&D weakens this effect. Thus, higher CS under 
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monopoly only occurs if ν is either in the low or medium ranges.  This is true for all the cases in 
both tables. 
b) Specific explanations for the parameters aM, aN, M and N in table I:
Marginal costs c1 and c2
If  c1 > c2 the new monopolist takes over firm 2's cost structures after M&A. Since firm 2 is 
only active in market  M before the M&A takes place, there is an “immediate” positive effect of 
M&A  for  consumers  in  market  N,  namely  lower  pre-R&D marginal  costs  of  the  monopolist 
(hereafter called the “direct positive effect” of R&D). Due to this effect,  c1 >  c2 yields rather a 
favorable condition of higher CS through M&A than c1 < c2.
If c1  < c2, the probability for higher CS under monopoly increases if either firm 2's pre-R&D 
marginal costs decrease or firm 1' pre-R&D  marginal costs increase. Furthermore, the closer the 
pre-R&D marginal costs of the two firms are to the maximum willingness to pay of consumers – aM 
and aN – the less market power the monopolist has and therefore, the more likely a CS enhancing 
M&A is. 
Size of market N: aN and n
If c1 > c2 , an increasing n causes higher CS through M&A, due to the direct positive effect in 
market  N which has been explained above. However, the value of  n cannot be in the high-end-
range. Firstly, if n is “too high”, it could violate the assumption that market N is not big enough to 
be profitable for firm 2 to enter into it. Secondly, a larger  n has a second effect, namely firm 1's 
post-R&D marginal cost advantage is more significant under competition.  This implies a higher 
asymmetry among the firms, which yields lower competitive pressure under competition. Thus, if n 
is  too  large,12 the  CS  enhancing  effect  of  M&A  becomes  weaker  than  the  negative  effect  of 
monopolization through M&A. So,  n should be in the middle ranges in order to have higher CS 
through M&A if c1 > c2. 
If we consider  c1 < c2 then firm 12 takes over the production plant of product 1, which was 
also sold in both markets before the M&A. Therefore, there is no direct positive effect of M&A. In 
12 Whenever we compare the advantages of firm 1 (serving both markets) and firm 2 (c2 < c1),  by a high (low) n we 
mean a value of n which yields to a significant overweight of firm 1's (2's) competitive advantage. Analogously, n is 
in the middle range, when the two firm's have similar post-R&D marginal costs. So whether the value of n is high or 
low, depends also on other factors such as the difference between c1 and c2. 
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that case changes in aN do not significantly influence the results. Higher CS through monopolization 
is less common when  c1 <  c2, and it is only possible when  M is large. A high  M is a necessary 
condition for higher CS through monopolization (see below for explanation). Therefore, N must be 
low in order that the condition m+n<2 ν holds. It should be emphasized that, no matter if c1 < c2 
or c1 > c2, the assumption that “market N is small enough so that a market entry of firm 2 would be 
unprofitable” should hold. This should also be considered when we analyze the other parameters as 
well.
Size of market M: aM and m
Assuming c1 > c2, if n is high, firm 1 invests already at a high level in process R&D and is the 
dominant firm in market M. In this case, a sinking m leads to significant reduction of firm 2's R&D 
investments, as market M is the only market it serves. A lower value of m weakens ceteris paribus 
the advantages of competition for consumers due to higher prices and higher asymmetry among the 
competing firms. Thus, if n is high, m should be low in order to have higher CS through M&A.
Consumers are hurt from M&A most when competition in market M is intense – for example 
when the post-R&D marginal costs of the competing firms are relatively equal. Assuming c1 > c2 
and n is small, competition is intense when m is in a range where it roughly balances out firm 1's 
and firm 2's competitive advantages and yields similar post-R&D marginal costs of these firms. If 
m is below (above) this range, then firm 1's (2's) advantage has tendentiously a higher weight than 
firm 2 's (1's) advantage and thus firm 1 (2) faces a weak competitor in market  M. In both cases 
where m is too small or too large, competition in market M does not significantly benefit consumers 
and thus M&A can lead to higher CS.
A lower  aM yields lower price settings of all firms both before and after M&A. Hereby, the 
merged firm 12 decreases its prices stronger than the firms under competition. The reason is that  
firm 12's market power depends more on aM than the market power of the competing firms 1 and 2. 
Hence, it is likely to have higher consumer welfare under monopoly the lower aM is. 
In a nutshell, if c1 < c2, there is no direct positive effect for the consumers in market N and as I 
mentioned above, a CS enhancing merger is less likely. However, the competing firms in market M 
are  asymmetric  because  firm 1  has  in  this  case  both  competitive  advantages:  lower  pre-R&D 
marginal costs as well as higher R&D incentives due to serving market N. Since a larger m yields 
more aggressive R&D investments of the dominant firm 1, it reinforces the asymmetry among the 
firms  and  leads  to  lower  benefits  of  competition  for  consumers.  Therefore,  a  high  value  of 
parameter  m is  a  necessary  condition  for  higher  CS  through  M&A,  and  due  to  the
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restriction m+n<2 ν , the value of parameter n should be low.
4. Price discrimination is not possible
In this section, we assume that firm 1 can not price discriminate between markets  M and N, 
thus p1M = p1N = p1. This can be the case for instance when transportation costs are zero. There are 
also other examples where firm 1 can not price discriminate among the markets while its monopoly 
position in market N is ensured. Assume that market N represents country N̄ and its government 
protects market N against foreign competition under the condition that the protected firm has to set 
the same price in domestic market and in foreign market.  Through this law, the government of 
country N̄ protects the domestic firms against foreign competition, but prevents consumers to be 
harmed due to monopoly price setting of the domestic firm in the own market.
The main difference between section 3 and section 4 is that in the latter case firm 1 has to find 
a balanced unit price for both the competitive and the monopoly market to generate its maximum 
total  profits,  while  in  section  3  firm  1  can  simply  set  the  optimal  price  in  each  market.  A 
comparison of the price of firm 1 in this section (p1) with the prices of firm 1 in section 3 (p1m and 
p1n) shows that p1 is usually higher than p1M in market M, where firm 1 faces competition, and lower 
than p1N in market N, where firm 1 is a monopolist.
The derivations of prices, quantities, R&D investments and consumer welfare are analogous to 
section 2.3. Therefore, we do not explain them in this section again. However, the terms for prices, 
quantities and R&D investments can be found in appendix B. 
4.1 Analyzing the non-price-discrimination-case
Even though price discrimination is, in contrast to section 3, not possible in this section, there 
are no significant changes about how the parameters γ, ν, c1 and c2 should be compared to section 3, 
for a CS enhancing M&A. Since these parameters are already explained in section 3, they will not 
be repeated anymore in this section. The other parameters are briefly discussed here, before all 
parameters are summarized in table 2.
Size of market M: aM and m
If c2 < c1, both lower m and lower aM lead in this case to a more favorable situation for higher 
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CS through M&A.13 A lower  aM means  lower prices  under  monopoly and it  implies  that  each 
representative consumer profits less from competition. The reason has already been explained in the 
previous section. 
The smaller  m is,  the  smaller  is  the  number  of  consumers  in  market  M who profit  from 
competition. Furthermore, a smaller m weakens firm 2 as a competitor in market M, which creates 
an asymmetric competition there.
 Assuming c1 < c2, the situation changes because firm 1 has now both competitive advantages. 
In this  case, an increasing size of market  M (enhancing  aM or  m) yields more aggressive R&D 
investments of firm 1 and higher asymmetry among the competing firms, which yields rather CS 
enhancing M&A.
Size of market N: aN and n
As explained above – under the assumption that c2 < c1 – generally more consumers in market 
N profit from the direct positive effect of M&A, the higher  n and  aN are. However, if  n is rather 
large,  a  further  increasing  n causes  an  asymmetry  among  the  competing  firms,  and  yields  a 
dominant position of firm 1.14 In this case, a further increasing n is rather disadvantageous for CS 
enhancing M&A and therefore, n should be large but not too large.
The “optimal value” of aN for higher CS through M&A depends on aM. If aN is significantly 
lower than aM, then consumers' maximum willingness to pay is low in the market where firm 1 is 
monopolist and high in the market where it faces competition. In this case, firm 1 tendentiously 
chooses  a  low  unit  price  before  M&A.  Furthermore,  in  case  of  a  merger,  firm  12  faces  no 
competition anymore in market  M, which is the “wealthier market”, and it would set a high unit 
price. Therefore, if  c2 < c1, the values of aN and aM should not be too divergent in order to have a 
situation of higher CS through merger. 
The table below sums up the results for the non-price-discrimination case, assuming firm 12 
follows the one-product  strategy after M&A. The table  for status-quo strategy can be found in 
appendix C. The signs and legends are already explained in the table in section 3, so they are not 
mentioned here again. Contrary to the previous section, a high or low n does not cause significantly 
13  We should keep in mind that it is also in the non-price-discrimination-case a necessary condition, that γ should not 
be too high, otherwise consumers have higher CS if the competition authority forbids the M&A.
14  Reminder: whenever we are talking about high/large  m and/or  n,  it  should be set  in the context of the  
relationship of m and n with v, regarding the constraint m + n < 2 v. Furthermore, we consider values of n, 
which are small enough to not break the assumption that market N is not profitable for firm 2 to enter into it. 
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different combination of parameters, which lead to a situation of CS enhancing M&A. Therefore, 
there is no need to distinguish between low and high number of consumers in market N.
 Comp. Mode
Parameter 
NPD, One-product strategy
  c1 > c2 
 NPD, One-product strategy
 c1<c2
 γ   ≠ ↑  ↓
 ν   ↓→ n(+m)2
†  ↓→ n(+m)2
†
 aM   ↓ (Necessary Condition)  ↑
 aN   ↓ ,  ≈→ aM††  ↓
 m   ↓  ↑
 n .∩ .  ↑
Table II: What combinations of parameters lead to a consumer-welfare-enhancing M&A if price 
discrimination is not possible and the merged firm follows the one-product strategy.
For some parameters, we have very clear and robust results which are valid both in the PD 
case and in the NPD case. For example, γ and ν should be low in both cases independent of other 
parameters. The exact threshold value of γ and ν, which turns a merger into to a consumer-welfare-
enhancing merger does depend on other parameters. However, independent of other parameters, the 
finding that γ and ν need to be low is a robust result.
The mechanisms of other parameters are of a more complicated nature. For instance, if c
1
<c
2
, 
the  relative  values  of  aM and  m should  be  high  for  consumer  welfare  enhancing  merger  to 
monopoly. However, they are also cases where the parameters act different than the PD case. For 
example,  if  c
1
>c
2
 the value  of  a
N
 should rather  be low in the NPD case,  while  it  is  relatively 
insignificant in the PD case. Furthermore, when c1<c2,  the value of n should be rather low in the 
PD case, but it should be high in the NPD case. The reason is that, if c
2
 is significantly lower than 
c1, a smaller N yields a more dominant position of firm 2. On the other side, if c1<c2, then a  larger 
N further  emphasizes  the  already  dominant  position  of  firm  1.  As  this  example  shows,  the 
determination  of  parameter  values,  which  enable  a  consumer-surplus-enhancing  merger  to 
†† If n is rather high, aN should be even lower than aM and since a low value of aM is a necessary condition for 
higher consumer welfare through M&A, aN should also be low.
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monopoly is rather very complex and many variables my change depending on other variables. The 
tables are an attempt to depict and simplify the highly complex relationship among the different 
variables as much as possible. 
5. Conclusion
This paper demonstrates how M&A in a market influences the consumers' welfare both in that  
market  and in other markets where at least one of the merging firms offers its products too. The 
effect of M&A on the consumers in different markets is in many cases opposite sided. For instance, 
if price discrimination is possible, M&A in market M causes lower consumer surplus in that market, 
but higher consumer surplus in market  N. Clearly if consumers in market  N gain more from  the 
M&A than consumers in market  M lose, the aggregated consumer welfare increases through the 
merger. 
       Traditionally mergers between firms whose products are not close substitutes are viewed more 
favorably by the competition authorities. This is based on the premise that the merged firm would 
have  higher  incentive  to  reduce  outputs  when  the  products  are  better  substitutes.  This model 
confirms this assumption. However, it shows that this assumption can not be considered solely and 
many other factors need to be taken into account as well.
Even though this paper concentrates mainly on higher consumer welfare through M&A, we 
can also reverse the action of the model. By reversing the action of the game, we can show that 
under the same circumstances where M&A yields higher consumer surplus, a change in the mode of 
competition in market M from duopoly to monopoly can harm consumers. For that case, we need to 
assume that firm 1 is a monopolist  in both markets and firm 2 enters into market  M.  Thereby, 
consumers in market  M benefit, while consumers in market  N lose. Analogously to the scenario 
which was presented in this paper, firm 2's entry into market  M can result in lower aggregated 
consumer welfare, if consumers in market N lose more than consumers in market M gain. As it has 
already been explained above in footnote 5, we need to assume a different timing of the game for 
this scenario.
Moreover, this  paper examines what the typical  combinations of the parameter values are, 
which yield higher consumer welfare through M&A, respectively lower consumer surplus through 
market entry of firm 2 into market M. It also specifies what role each parameter plays in this setting, 
and how these parameters interact with each other. Thereby, we try to consider as many parameters 
as possible. It results into a vast amount of possibilities and different parameters influencing the 
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mechanisms in different  direction and that  yields  very complex results.  Possibly,  we try in  the 
future research to concentrate on few key parameters, such as  γ and ν, which deliver  clear and 
robust results both in the PD case and in the NPD case. This would contain less information than 
the current  version of the model,  however it  allows to focus on the more general  and tangible 
findings. 
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APPENDIX
NOTE: The terms in the appendix are copied from Wolfram Mathematica files. Therein, the terms 
used are slightly different than in the paper: “ca” is c1, “cb” is c2, “am” is aM and “an” is aN.
Appendix A:
Can M&A yield higher consumer surplus if firm 12 follows the status-quo strategy?
Graph: Profit of merged firm depending on the strategy it uses (PD).
The parameter values of the graph are c1= 38 c2=37 v=5 aM=85 aN=84 m=1.6 n=1.2
The graph shows the profits of the firm 12 when it chooses the status-quo strategy (purple line) 
versus the one-product strategy with product 1 (Blue), respectively with product 2 (Red). It chooses 
its  profit  maximizing strategy depending on degree of competition.  In this case, firm 12 would 
chose  the  status-quo  strategy only  in  the  area  where  the  products  are  extremely  differentiated
(γ < 0.09). 
Graph:  Consumer  surplus  under  Duopoly  (Dot-dashed)  versus  Monopoly  (Dashed),  if   PD  is 
possible.
The parameter values of the graph are: c1 =40, c2 =20, am =220, an = 200, v = 4, m = 0.5, n = 0.6
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The graph shows the aggregated  consumer  surplus  in  the monopoly case (blue dashed)  vs  the 
competition  case  (purple  dash-dotted).  Thereby,  firm  12  can  choose  between  the  one-product 
strategy with the more profitable product (In this case product 2), and the status-quo strategy. Firm 
12 chooses its profit maximizing strategy depending on degree of competition. In this case, it would 
chose the status-quo strategy only in the area where the products are extremely differentiated (here 
when γ < 0.22). In this graph consumer surplus is always higher after M&A, independent of the 
profit  maximizing  strategy of  the  merged  monopolist.  The  graph depicts  that  higher  consumer 
surplus due to M&A is also possible when firm 12 follows the one-product strategy.
Appendix B
Prices, Quantities and Marginal Cost Reductions of firms 1 and 2 when price discrimination 
is not possible
Price of Firm 1:
Price of Firm 2:
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Quanity sold by firm 1 in market M (q1M)
Quanity sold by firm 1 in market N (q1N )
Quanity sold by firm 2 (q2)
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Optimal amount of cost reductions of firms 1 and 2:
x1 if firm 1 competes with firm 2 in market M: 
x1 when firm 2 exits market M in stage t1 and firm 1 follows the status-quo strategy as a monopolist:
(−2a m+2 cbm−a n γ+ca n γ)
((n−2 v) γ)
x2 in competitive area:
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Appendix C
Status-quo strategy or one-product strategy?
The  table  below  demonstrates  under  which  circumstances  firm  12  rather  chooses
status-quo strategy instead of the one-product strategy.
Comp. 
Mode
Parameter 
Firm 12 chooses status-quo strategy
over one-product strategy
γ  ↑
ν ↓→
n(+m)
2
†
aM ↓
aN ↑
c1 - c2 c1 < c2 not NC
m ↑
n ↑
†: ν should be as low as possible, however the condition ν>
n(+m)
2 should not be violated. 
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